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Summary !!
“Taken together, interconnectivity and opaqueness were a perfect recipe for 
disaster.  Interconnectivity meant high contagion risks and the ability for a single 
failure to spread to the entire financial system. Opaqueness meant that many firms 
were simply unaware of these contagion risks and therefore failure to implement 
appropriate risk management practices.  This was compounded by the fact that even 
regulators lacked the information required to properly assess the build-up of 
exposures in the market and devise preventive measures.”1  
 
Against this background, regulators worldwide came together to work on a reform of 
the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market. Central counterparty (“CCP”) 
clearing of these OTC derivatives was identified as one of the key ways of mitigating 
the weaknesses seen in the financial crisis that culminated in the fall of 2008. 
Therefore, the G20 leaders agreed that all standardised OTC derivatives should be 
cleared through CCPs by end 2012. Over the last years regulators across the globe 
have developed legal frameworks governing this central clearing mandate. 
 
Despite the efforts for international harmonisation, it seems like various regulators 
have not conquered the vastly troublesome task of regulating an international market 
on a national basis. Extraterritorial and protectionist approaches, especially seen in the 
US and the EU frameworks, cause participants and CCPs operating cross-border 
transactions great problems. International participants will have to comply with an 
overlapping multi-layered web of regulatory requirements, which may force them to 
re-structure their trades and hold multiple clearing memberships or multiple client 
clearing arrangements. CCPs face the prospect of not being able to clear transactions 
for their international participants. In turn, these problems bring about detrimental 
effects to the financial market on the whole.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Extract from speech held by Edmond Lau, Executive Director of Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/speech-speakers/eyplau/20111025.shtml) (All websites 
visited on 4 August 2012). 
!! %!
There are no perfect ways of solving the problems identified. Nevertheless, there are 
ways to mitigate the negative effects of these extraterritorial and protectionist 
provisions either by slight changes to the frameworks or through other means.  
 
On an overall level, further harmonisation across jurisdictions would be preferable. 
On the legislative level, well-balanced regimes for recognition of overseas CCPs are 
identified as the best, and most likely, way of solving the problems. Examining the 
proposed regimes for recognition of overseas CCPs, it would be beneficial to require 
CCPs to meet requirements on par with international standards instead of requiring 
them to meet requirements equivalent to domestic laws as seen in today’s recognition 
regimes. Alternatively, applicant CCPs’ standards should be assessed in relation to 
domestic laws, but on an effect-based level. Stepping outside the legislative world, 
interoperability between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives is recognised as a possible 
problem solver. However, due to the risks associated with interoperability in 
combination with the immaturity of the OTC frameworks and lack of experience in 
clearing these OTC products, introducing interoperability as a solution to the 
problems identified cannot be justified to date.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the business models of financial 
institutions (“FIs”), in particular in relation to the practice of wholesale investment 
banks. These vulnerabilities include opacity, high leverage, risk management 
weaknesses and a high degree of interconnectedness between FIs. 
 
One can mention several reasons why the recent financial crisis grew to be one of the 
greatest of all times, but arguably no factor was and remains more singularly 
associated with the detrimental interconnectedness between FIs than their active 
presence in the OTC derivatives market.2 By definition, the OTC derivatives market 
does not have a central marketplace where all trades occur.3 These contracts are 
traded off-exchanges on a bilateral basis, which means lack of transparency and 
limited abilities to assess exposures and interconnections of participants in this 
market.4 
 
At the apex of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 even the best capitalised FIs came 
under great stress due to the fear of inextricably connection between the market 
participants. Major dealers were connected through tens of thousands of bilateral 
OTC contracts – a system which includes the consequence that when a dealer fails, its 
surviving counterparties are left with outstanding positions and a need to replace 
“orphaned” contracts in a volatile market. This is what happened when Lehman 
Brother defaulted.5 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis it became apparent that neither market participants 
nor regulators had a good understanding of exposures and linkages within the OTC 
derivatives markets. The poorly utilised bilateral risk management tools, the inherent 
interconnectedness and opacity of the markets were factors identified as key issues 
that needed to be dealt with to achieve stability. This understanding led to a search for 
new market institutions that could reduce the likelihood and severity of financial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Yavorsky, OTC derivatives market structure and the credit profiles of wholesale investment banks p. 
144.   
3 Acharya, Cooley, Matthew and Walter (2011) p. 368. 
4 Acharya, Cooley, Matthew and Walter (2011) p. 368. 
5 Acharya, Cooley, Matthew and Walter (2011) p. 368-369.!
!! (!
crises. 6 Alongside three other key measures, clearing through CCPs was identified as 
a problem solver. 
Given the highly globalised nature of the OTC derivatives market, it was 
acknowledged that the OTC reform had to be internationally coordinated. Such 
movement emerged in 2009 when the G20 leaders agreed that: 
“All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported 
to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher 
capital requirements.”7 
The year of 2012 is here, the deadline for implementation of the G20 objectives is 
rapidly approaching and regulators are urged to aggressively push ahead to achieve 
full implementation.8 The, up until now, largely unregulated OTC derivatives market 
currently faces major changes as legal frameworks9 are being proposed across the 
globe. Despite all good intentions however, these regulatory regimes are causing great 
obstacles to overcome for participants10 and CCPs.  
The trading of OTC derivatives is to a great extent executed on an international basis 
with cross-border trading and international participants.11 This in itself is as a reason 
for imposing extraterritorial provisions. However, the extraterritorial and protectionist 
provisions seen in these new frameworks cause great distress to both participants and 
CCPs in trying to comply with several regulatory regimes put forward in various 
jurisdictions. Duplicative rules will cost, ultimately impacting the real economy, 
while not necessarily serving any regulatory goal. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 5.  
7 G20, Pittsburgh Summit Leader’s Statement, 24-25 September 2009 
(www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/pittsburgh.pdf). 
8 FSB, Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations p.18 
9 Throughout, I use the term ”frameworks” to mean laws and regulations governing the G20 objectives, 
and the central counterparty clearing mandate in particular. 
10 “participants” are for the purpose of this paper defined as the institutions that will be subject to the 
clearing mandate, i.e. traders being clearing members or clients to clearing members of CCPs. 
11 A very high proportion of the trading in the OTC derivatives market is cross-border, and this trend is 
apparent across most currencies and counterparty types. For example, almost 65% of transactions (by 
value) in OTC interest rate derivatives take place between counterparties resident in different countries. 
Please refer to BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 5. 
!! )!
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to: 
(i) Identify problems caused by the new regulatory regimes governing the central 
clearing mandate across the globe, focusing on extraterritorial and 
protectionist provisions that will bring about problems for (a) participants and 
(b) CCPs, from a cross-border point of view; and to 
(ii) Identify and analyse possible solutions or ways to mitigate the problems 
identified.  
1.3 Method and Theoretical Framework 
1.3.1 Introduction 
Reading this paper expecting a traditional student essay, it would perhaps appear that 
this has little to do with law or legal research and that the author in question largely 
must have misunderstood the task in front of her. The reason why this thought or 
opinion may surface is because the method and theoretical framework used in this 
thesis is not the average of a traditional legal research. The area of law and objective 
chosen simply do not allow for such traditional method to be applied for the following 
reasons: 
• This is a brand new area of law generated by weaknesses in a market and 
created to mitigate these weaknesses. Naturally, it is tightly connected to the 
economics of the financial market and the practice and business of key 
institutions in this market, why research from a market perspective is essential.  
• The law concerned in this thesis lack of classic legal sources – such as 
doctrine, case law and traditional legal research – and as a consequence 
demands a different approach to analysing the relevant legal questions asked. 
• The approach of this thesis is neither national nor international law. Instead, 
the thesis focuses on the problems that can emanate from a legislative 
structure where national law regulates an international market. Likewise, the 
research performed on how to resolve these problems is not from a specific 
country’s perspective, but on a global multi-jurisdictional level. This approach 
requires a method that focuses on the structural issues rather than the 
traditional legal questions related to specific jurisdictions’ laws.  
 
!! *+!
The method and the theoretical framework that are described in the following are 
chosen to comply with the criterions set out above. 
1.3.2 Chosen Method and Basic Assumptions 
As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, the traditional legal dogmatic method 
has not been applied in this thesis.12 The reason why another methodical approach has 
been chosen is – in short – because the legal dogmatic method could and cannot 
answer the legal questions raised in this thesis, in particular with regard to the 
following.  
 
The legal dogmatic method generally aims to describe and interpret the law. 
Furthermore it presupposes that the aim of legal research is to serve the judges in their 
judgements, to outline a consensus on how a matter of law ought to be interpreted. 
The main perspective is therefore that of a judge.13 A natural consequence of this 
method’s aim is the usage of the authoritative frame of the doctrine of sources of law, 
even if other sources may be used as a complement when aiming to determine a legal 
unclarity.14 The legal dogmatic method may not be a necessity for legal research, but 
nevertheless permeates the other broadly accepted methods and theories seen in legal 
science, at least from a Swedish perspective.15 
 
The aim of this thesis is, on the contrary, not to in depth examine “existing law”. 
Neither is the purpose to provide interpretive guidance to legal practitioners such as 
judges and lawyers, but rather to analyse a brand new area of law from a market 
perspective in order to come up with legal and practical solutions to the structural 
problems identified in these frameworks.16 To fulfill this aim the method described in 
the following has been used.! 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Part I in this paper describes the role of a CCP and the legal frameworks that are analysed in this 
thesis. Of course, at least a “light version” of the legal dogmatic method was used in this part. 
However, describing the frameworks is actually not a part of the objective of this thesis, but rather a 
necessary step to enable the analysis performed to achieve the objective. For this reason the legal 
dogmatic method used in Part I is left aside for the purpose of framing the method used to achieve the 
objective of this thesis. 
13 Ross (1953) p. 47 et seq. 
14 Sandgren (2006) p. 534-536. 
15 This assumption is predominant in most analysis of what legal science is and which methods that 
may be used in legal research. See e.g. Sandgren (2006), Olsen (SvJT 2004). 
16 That said, not meant that judges and lawyers do not need to take part of or consider new legal and 
practical solutions.  
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Three perspectives have been applied throughout the paper; 
1. the participant perspective; 17 
2. the CCP perspective; and 
3. the market perspective. 
 
The market perspective itself, i.e. what serves the stability and resilience of the 
market, is closely connected to the other two perspectives. To put it simply, an overall 
market perspective is applied, but analysed through the eyes of the two most relevant 
stakeholders: the participants and the CCPs. It may not be ideal to distinctly separate 
these three perspectives at all times. After all, both the participants and the CCPs 
somewhat constitute the market. As a consequence these three perspectives may not 
necessarily represent opposing interests.  
1.3.3.1 Identification, Creation and Justification – from Three Perspectives 
The three perspectives follow the objective of this paper. Firstly, the frameworks are 
analysed from the three perspectives to identify problems from a global standpoint. 
Secondly, analysis of the problems for the purpose of creating solutions to the same is 
provided, this also through the method of applying the three perspectives. In the 
creation process, the analysis also steps outside the legal frameworks to investigate if 
any other legal devices seen in associated markets would benefit the three 
perspectives. Finally, by applying the three perspectives on the proposed solutions, 
assessments are made whether these can be justified or not. It may, as indicated 
above, not be beneficial to differentiate the market perspective from the participant 
and CCP perspective at all times, i.e. it serves no purpose to distinguish the 
perspectives when the arguments from both sides coincide.  
 
Naturally, the best solution is reached when it furthers both the participant and the 
CCP perspective, but not on the cost of a less resilient and stabile market. This 
statement invokes a slightly controversial passus, namely; what is deemed good for 
the participants, the CCPs and the market on the whole - is trading for the greater 
good? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The participant perspective is that of the institutions that will be subject to the clearing mandate, i.e. 
traders being clearing members or clients to clearing members of CCPs. 
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1.3.3.2 The Axiomatic Perception – Trading is for the Greater Good! 
In most markets it is fairly accepted that increased trading is good and foster 
prosperity, in general one could say that it is an axiomatic assumption. Simply put, 
phenomenons that obstruct trading are generally deemed bad. When it comes to the 
trading of (some) OTC derivatives however, opinions part. There have been calls for 
prohibiting the trading, as it may be recognised as only benefit some financial 
institutions, but possibly being largely detrimental to the economy on the whole. 
Nevertheless, national regulators and international bodies seem to have come to the 
conclusion that the trading of OTC derivatives is good, albeit under controlled 
circumstances. Thus, adopting the same conclusion, the method used in this thesis is 
based on the assumption that - trading is for the greater good!  
1.3.3 Benefits from and Challenges of Chosen Method 
The method chosen benefits the objective of this paper by means of keeping the 
practical perspective on this new area of law. In many ways these frameworks are not 
ready to be studied from a strictly classic legal perspective. Applying the method of 
three perspectives from a global standpoint allows an analysis of the new legal 
frameworks without getting into too many details that are not yet finalised, but to on a 
structural level discover what problems there are at this stage and to propose legal and 
practical solutions.  
 
The challenge is not so much of a methodological issue, but rather the lack of reliable 
and authoritative sources. The scientific level can thereby be questioned. Nevertheless 
it is at least an attempt to combine knowledge of an industry with legal thinking, and 
the thesis itself shows the necessity to as a lawyer, scholar, judge, or whichever 
perspective you may apply, know the surroundings where your legal thinking touches 
ground.  
1.3.4 Material  
Indicating the lack of reliable and authoritative sources, it may be worthwhile saying 
a few words on material used. This is a rapidly developing area of law, thus changes 
in the legal frameworks analysed may be underway. However, both the US and the 
EU legal frameworks are properly adopted, but all relevant details are not yet 
finalised in subsidiary legislation. When it comes to the other jurisdictions’ 
frameworks, these are merely in the consultation stage, thus less reliable.  
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In addition to legislative frameworks, the materials studied are mainly reports and 
recommendations issued by internationally recognised organisations and institutions. 
These sources are reliable and authoritative within this area of law. However, one can 
argue that these sources tend to be less “objective” compared to information and 
analysis available in relation to areas of law penetrated by legal scholars and judges. 
To conclude, even though the most reliable sources are used, legislations are possibly 
subject to change and recommendation and analysis may vary depending on the 
author, who generally is supported by a certain stakeholder. 
1.4 Delimitations  
Given CCPs’ increased importance in mitigating counterparty risk and 
interconnectedness in the OTC derivatives markets, which were predominant reasons 
for the failure and great stress FIs faced in the financial crisis, this paper focuses on 
the regulatory regimes governing the central clearing obligation. For the purpose of 
this paper, the remaining three G20 objectives are largely left aside. Although, a brief 
description of the other objectives is provided and attention is drawn to these when 
needed for deeper understanding.  
 
References will be made to legislation proposed or implemented in the jurisdictions 
holding the largest OTC market, which foremost are the EU and the US. To get a 
better overview and to take account of Asia’s growing importance in the international 
financial market, references will also be made to countries in Asia Pacific where 
relevant. Even though Japan holds a large OTC derivatives market, the regulation in 
Japan is largely left aside due to difficulties in analysing primary sources. The aim is 
not to give an exhaustive detailed description of legislation proposed, but rather to 
emphasise problematic national provisions in an international context, by way of 
example, in line with the thesis’ objective.  
 
The phenomenon to regulate extraterritorially may be interesting to discuss from an 
international law perspective, however this discussion does not fit within the objective 
of this thesis and is thus left aside.  
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1.5 Disposition  
This paper is structured in three parts. Part I gives the reader a background as to the 
role of and benefits from central counterparty clearing and the regulatory 
development seen in various jurisdictions governing the clearing mandate. Part I 
provides the reader an understanding of the regulations’ structure and information 
necessary to thoroughly follow Part II and III. In Part II problems caused by the 
regulations described in Part I are being identified. The problems will also be 
exemplified by certain scenarios, which hopefully benefit the reader’s understanding. 
Subsequently, analysis as to why regulators persist in proposing these regulations 
despite its problems caused will be provided. By doing so, the reader will enhance its 
ability to recognise the complexity in regulating the OTC derivatives markets. Finally, 
Part III analyses and proposes possible solutions or ways to mitigate the problems 
caused. Reaching the end, some concluding remarks and personal points of view are 
outlined.  !  
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PART I – CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING 
AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 
2 Central Counterparty Clearing 
Prior to addressing the frameworks governing the central clearing mandate it is 
relevant to firstly give a brief account of the G20 objectives and their purposes 
respectively and more thoroughly explain the role of and benefits from central 
counterparty clearing.  
2.1 G20 Objectives 
One of four objectives set out by the G20 prescribes that all standardised OTC 
contracts shall be cleared through CCPs, which is the main focus in this paper.18 In 
addition G20 prescribed three closely connected objectives: on-exchange trading of 
OTC derivatives where appropriate, reporting of OTC derivatives transactions to trade 
repositories and higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared products. In 
2011 G20 agreed to add margin requirements on non-centrally cleared derivatives.19 
 
The main purposes of the objective of requiring on-exchange trading of OTC 
derivatives are to achieve standardisation, increase transparency, enabling oversight 
and to protect against market abuse.20 The regulatory development as regards this 
objective has not progressed to the same extent as the other objectives.  
The reporting mandate is likewise introduced to increase transparency, enabling 
proper oversight. The idea is that trade repositories should play an important role in 
providing information, enabling authorities to ascertain accurate information 
concerning the OTC contract shortly after it is entered into, as well as information 
concerning any changes to the contract throughout its existence. In turn this available 
information could serve to promote financial stability, assist in detection and 
prevention of market abuse and enhance the transparency of information relevant to 
authorities and the public.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The G20 objective of requiring clearing through central counterparties is in this paper commonly 
referred to as the ”clearing mandate” or ”clearing prescription”. 
19 G20, Cannes summit final declaration (www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/cannes.pdf). 
20 IOSCO, Report on Trading of OTC Derivatives p. 4. 
21 BIS and IOSCO, Report on OTC derivatives data reporting and aggregation requirements p. 2. 
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Recognising that not all OTC derivatives would be suited for central clearing due to 
lack of standardisation and insufficient liquidity, participants trading non-centrally 
cleared products will be subject to higher capital requirements and posting of 
collateral instead. Imposing capital and margin requirements on non-centrally cleared 
contracts will not mitigate the systemic risk for the purpose of reduction of 
interconnectedness, neither mitigate the counterparty risk associated. However, 
margin requirements for non-centrally-cleared derivatives would be expected to 
reduce contagion and spillover effects by ensuring that collateral are available to 
offset losses caused by the default of a counterparty. Furthermore, if the participants 
need to post collateral regardless of using a clearing house, this could promote 
voluntary clearing making the G20’s reform programme more effective.22 Regulations 
concerning margin and capital requirements for non-centrally cleared products are 
underway.23 
2.2 The Role of and Benefits from Central Clearing  
Widely spoken, a CCP may be understood as a market-generated “legal device”, an 
institution designed to manage risks in the markets by means of the interaction of 
various private law techniques.24 To be clear, the central counterparty is just an 
ordinary company whose only business is to act as a central counterparty. Its shares 
can be owned by the participants who are using the company, or the shares can be 
owned by independent shareholders or by for example an exchange.25!Realising that 
the reader of this paper may not be familiar with the concept of clearing through 
central counterparties, it is necessary to give an account of how the CCP actually 
works. This knowledge is essential to understand the clearing mandate’s impact on 
participants, CCPs and the market, as being analysed in Part II and III of this paper.  
2.2.1 The CCP as a Central Counterparty 
Simply put, the CCP becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. 
As a consequence the buyer and seller of a product will not be counterparties, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 BCBS-IOSCO, Margin requirements for non-centrally-cleared derivatives p. 2. 
23 See for example the ESAs, Joint Discussion Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on risk 
mitigation techniques. The paper analyses possible options for the regulatory technical standards on the 
level of capital and collateral counterparties to derivatives transactions need to maintain, type of 
collateral and segregation arrangements. 
24 The CCP as being a legal device compricing several private law techniques is meritoriously analysed 
by Braithwaite, Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription. 
25 Wood (2009). 
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contractually liaise solely with the CCP. As indicated by its name, the CCP becomes a 
central counterparty to the original counterparties. This is perhaps the most 
fundamental legal point about CCP clearing, the contracts in question are between the 
CCP and the members of the clearing system rather than between members 
themselves.26 Depending on the structure of the clearing system, this outcome may be 
achieved in two different ways. Either member A and B, who wish to trade e.g. a 
derivative, contract in the first instance directly with the CCP, or A and B contract 
with each other initially, after which their contract is replaced by new ones between 
each member and the CCP.27 
 
Source: IMF (2010) 
 
The CCP assumes responsibility for the obligations associated with the transaction, 
thus naturally takes on the counterparty risk. In event of a clearing member’s 
default,28 the CCP would still owe the corresponding obligations to the surviving 
member.  
2.2.2 Clearing Membership 
In order to clear a transaction through a CCP, the participant must be a clearing 
member to the CCP. A participant would only be admitted as a clearing member if 
meeting various requirements and are required to at all times comply with the clearing 
rules as set out by the CCP.29 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Braithwaite, Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription p. 13. 
27 IOSCO, Principles for financial market infrastructures p 9 and 24. 
28 Throughout, I use the term ”default” to mean ”fail to perform on contractual obligations”, and 
”defaulter” to refer to a party that does not perform in accordance with its contractual obligations. 
29 Clearing houses are often self regulatory organisations which set out their own rules for the market 
participants to follow in order to utilise their services. For example, see SGX-DC’s Clearing Rules 
(http://rulebook.sgx.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=3271&element_id=1903). 
The latter arrangement depends on 
the legal technique of novation, 
which allows for the bilateral 
contract between A and B to be 
replaced by two parallel contracts 
between A and the CCP and B and 
the CCP, with no rights or 
obligations remaining between the 
original parties.  
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For admittance the participant must show sufficient capital funds, have well-
established risk management procedures, fulfil fit and proper criteria, and in some 
cases it must have a bank parent, or be guaranteed by a bank with sufficient capital 
funds, etc.30 Usually it is also a prerequisite to be authorised by relevant authority, i.e. 
to hold relevant license for carrying out the regulated activity. 
The membership criteria ought to be high, since the survival of the CCP, being a 
systemically important financial institution, to a great extent is dependent on its 
members’ stability.31 The set requirements and clearing rules differs both between 
jurisdictions and between clearing houses, even though harmonisation is desirable 
considering regulatory arbitrage and moral hazard issues.32 Once admitted as a 
clearing member, it is allowed to clear its transactions executed with the CCP’s other 
clearing members in accordance with the clearing rules. 
2.2.3 Client Clearing Arrangement 
Some participants will not be able to meet the membership criteria and ongoing 
compliance with the clearing rules. Such participants must find a clearing member to 
act for them, allowing them to clear its transactions through that clearing member. 
This is known as client clearing or indirect clearing. The client33 contracts with the 
clearing member, which in turn contracts with the CCP clearing the transaction. Since 
the client and the CCP are not counterparties, the CCP cannot directly set up 
requirements to be met by the client. Although, a clearing member not only clearing 
proprietary positions, but also client positions will be subject to an additional set of 
rules and criteria relating to the client clearing arrangement. Thus, the CCP imposes 
requirements on the clients through its clearing members.  
2.2.4 The CCP’s Protection 
As described above, the CCP assumes counterparty risk and owes obligations to the 
surviving counterparty in event of another’s default. Naturally, the CCP must protect 
itself against defaulting members and have sufficient funds to preform its obligations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 See for example LCH.Clearnet’s admittance requirements 
(http://www.lchclearnet.com/membership/ltd/) and SGX-DC’s admittance requirements 
(www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/96c2e60048e8fc9fa6bdefdd0ab5b648/SGX%2BMembership%2BBr
ochure%2BEnglish.pdf?MOD=AJPERES). 
31 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 2.  
32 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 2. 
33 A ”client” may also be referred to as a ”customer”. 
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towards surviving members. Otherwise the benefits from central clearing would be 
replaced with great systemic risk. The CCP’s protection is managed by requiring 
collateral and the building up of a default fund.  
To clear transactions, the clearing member must post collateral (margin) with the 
clearing house, which is the CCP’s first line of defence in a situation of a clearing 
member’s default. The amount of margin required depends on the clearing member’s 
exposure, how big the current and future credit risk of the transaction is.34 Firstly, the 
member is required to post an initial margin. CCPs typically set initial margin to 
reflect the estimate of the riskiness of the underlying transaction. For instance, they 
tend to charge higher margins on instruments with more volatile prices, and on less 
liquid instruments that take a CCP longer to cover in the event of a default.35 In other 
words, the amount of margin depends on the characteristic of the product. This is the 
reason why the contracts need to be standardised and liquid enough to be eligible for 
clearing, otherwise the CCP would not be able to thoroughly calculate the margin and 
protect itself against default.36 
In addition, the member is required to, daily or intra-daily, post variation margin. The 
amount of variation margin is based on changes in price since last mark-to-market 
calculation. Those whose contracts have declined in value as a result of these price 
changes are obligated to pay the CCP an amount equal to this change in market value. 
In turn, the CCP is obligated to pay those whose contracts have increased in value an 
amount equal to this change in market value, albeit the clearing member may choose 
to keep the excess collateral in the CCP for future fluctuations.37 Recognising that it is 
costly to post margins at CCPs due to the type of collateral accepted, it is impractical 
to utilise a pure “defaulters pay” model.38 Thus CCPs do not collateralize against all 
possible price movements. As described, CCP margin typically does not depend on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 "Exposure" can also be described as the risk that a bankrupt cannot pay, see Wood (2009).  
35 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 8 and 16. 
36 For criteria to be assessed when determining clearing eligible products, refer to FSB, Implementing 
OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, p. 13 et seq. Among other relevant criteria the products need to be 
standardised, surrounded by reliable pricing sources and liquid enough to be eligible for clearing. 
Please also refer to para. 3.2 below for an account of regulations governing the determination of 
clearing eligible products.!!
37 Pirrong,The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 7-9. 
38 CCPs typically require that margins be posted in liquid assets, normally cash or government 
securities, which yield less than other investments. However, if other less liquid assets were accepted, 
the positions may be under-margined due to changes in the value of the collateral. See Pirrong, The 
Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 8 and 32. 
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the creditworthiness of a clearing member, but on product risk characteristics. This 
may be problematic since the CCP only calculates the risk in relation to the clearing 
member’s exposure to the CCP, and not the clearing member’s exposure to other 
CCPs or non-derivatives-related risks.39 
Besides the need to post margins, the clearing members also have to contribute to the 
CCP’s default fund. Taken together, the margins and the default fund make up the 
CCP’s “default waterfall”, out of which it has to cover its losses upon default of a 
clearing member. How CCPs may use its resources differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and from clearing house to clearing house. Generalising, it would be fair 
to say that the CCP firstly may use the collateral posted by the defaulting member. 
Secondly, the CCP may use the default fund contribution of the defaulting clearing 
member, and thirdly the rest of the default fund.40 By using the default fund, the 
default losses are mutualised among the clearing members contributing to the default 
fund. The CCP may not use surviving members’ collateral to cover losses emanating 
from another member’s default, therefore the CCP must hold segregated accounts for 
its clearing members.41 
When it comes to client clearing the same principles apply. The client must post 
collateral with the CCP, but within its member’s customer account. A member 
clearing both proprietary and client positions has both a house account and a 
customers account in the CCP for posting of collateral. To what extent CCPs must 
have segregated accounts for customers’ collateral is under debate, but for example 
EMIR prescribes that a CCP must offer segregated accounts to its customers.42 The 
level of segregation is foremost a question of protection for the clearing members and 
their clients, but it is also a matter of facilitating the transfer of clients’ assets and 
positions (i.e. porting) in event of a clearing member’s default.43 
2.2.5 The Nature of the Derivatives Contract 
In order to get a clear picture of how the CCP manages its risks, it is necessary to be 
reminded of the nature of a derivatives contract. A clearing facility can be used for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 13-14. 
40 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 21. 
41 IOSCO, Principles for financial market infrastructures p.78-80. 
42 EMIR, Article 39. 
43 EMIR, Recital 64. 
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clearing securities and other “immediate” contracts as well. In such case the 
transaction will be concluded once the security, and the agreed upon consideration for 
the security, has been exchanged. Then the transaction is out of the clearing system. 
In contrast, an OTC derivatives transaction results in the creation of an ongoing 
contractual relationship, which may last for years.44 Derivatives contracts can easily 
be described as promises to pay amounts that depend on some market price on an 
underlying. The underlying can be for example an interest rate, commodity or an 
event such as a bankruptcy of a particular company. The main forms of OTC 
derivatives are swaps, options and forwards.45 Swaps enable the counterparties to 
swap obligations, for example swapping an obligation to pay a floating rate of interest 
on debt for a fixed rate of interest (i.e. an interest rate swap).46 An option entitles the 
buyer to sell or buy a specified amount of an underlying product at a specific date, if 
exercising that right would be profitable for the buyer (i.e. the buyer may choose to 
buy or sell the underlying or not).47 By contrast, a forward obliges the buyer to sell or 
buy the specified amount of the underlying at a specific date, regardless of whether it 
would be profitable or not.48 Derivatives are traded for two main purposes, either to 
protect against price fluctuations as a sort of insurance (“hedging”) or for pure 
speculation, simply to earn profit.49 
The value of derivatives contracts varies with market conditions and prices, and 
changes in market conditions subsequent to the creation of a derivatives contract 
generally causes the contract to become an asset to one counterparty and a liability to 
the other. If a party for whom the contract is a liability defaults, then its counterparty 
is at risk of loosing the whole value of the contract. During the derivative’s longevity, 
the CCP assumes the counterparty risk in relation to both original counterparties, and 
as a protection collects margins accordingly. To conclude, the long maturity and 
bespoke nature of many OTC derivatives contracts create heavier risks than on-
exchange traded derivatives or other securities, which are highly standardised and 
typically of quite short duration.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 IOSCO, International Standards for Derivatives Market Intermediary Regulation p. 9. 
45 Hudson (2009) p. 1087. 
46 Hudson (2009) p. 1099 et seq. 
47 Hudson (2009) p. 1095 et seq. 
48 Hudson (2009) p.1098-1099. 
49 Hudson (2009) p.1091 et seq. 
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2.2.6 Actions in Event of Default 
If the buyer or seller defaults, the CCP is contractually obliged to pay all that is owed 
to the non-defaulting counterparty; the CCP would need to close outstanding 
positions, which is facilitated through netting.50 Netting of positions across multiple 
parties typically reduces the total number of positions that need to be replaced. 
Position netting could be described as follows: Picturing a bilateral transaction where 
A sells a contract to B, who sells the contract to C. In event of B’s default, its 
positions would remain open, thus have contractual obligations to both A and C. 
However, if the transaction is cleared through a CCP, B’s contracts would be netted 
out and B’s contractual obligation extinguished. In this latter scenario neither A nor C 
would suffer from B’s default as long as the CCP remains solvent. Furthermore, the 
CCP facilitates exposure netting. A clearing member may suffer some losses in 
relation to some of its contracts, and gains in relation to others. In such case the gains 
are netted against the losses, which limits the exposure of the CCP since the amount 
owed to a member (i.e. the member’s gain) is netted against its losses.51 To orderly 
replace the outstanding positions after netting, the CCP may auctioning off the 
defaulter’s contractual obligations. 
 
 
       
Illustration of netting benefits when clearing through a CCP            Source: IMF (2010) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 For example, in a bilateral transaction, if A owes B 100 and B owes A 100 and B becomes bankrupt, 
then, if A can set off, its exposure is zero.  If A cannot set off, its exposure could be up to 100 if B has 
no assets. The result of a central clearing arrangement is that, if B becomes bankrupt, the central 
counterparty can set off or net against B since all the trades are mutual as between the central 
counterparty and B, see Wood (2009).!
51 For a description of the netting procedure, please refer to Pirrong, The Economics of Central 
Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 7. 
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As to customers’ positions in a situation of its clearing member’s default, the CCP can 
facilitate transfer of the defaulting member’s customer positions to another financially 
sound clearing member. This is commonly referred to as porting of customers’ 
positions. Such portability eliminates the need to close-out positions held in a 
defaulted clearing member’s customer account. From a client point of view, this 
mechanism reduces the risk of clients suffering losses as a result of a clearing 
member’s default. Furthermore, if segregated properly, this also protects customers’ 
collateral from being encumbered by a possible bankruptcy process.52 
2.2.7 Benefits from Central Clearing 
That the CCP becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer 
underpins some of the most important benefits of the CCP prescription, since the CCP 
can act as a shock absorber on the insolvency of a market participant. In other words, 
the CCPs are intended to increase the likelihood that contractually promised payments 
will be done. The use of central clearing can enhance the resilience of the market 
through a range of direct and indirect channels as follows: 
• The multiple bi-lateral relationships would be replaced with a single 
relationship with the CCP. The use of a CCP shields the counterparties from 
other participants’ default with the primary benefit of reduction of system-
wide counterparty credit risk and interdependencies of market participants. 
There would still be a counterparty risk towards the CCP, but this poses less 
risk since the CCP is prudently regulated, well capitalised and hold enough 
collateral to “guarantee” performance of transactions. (See illustration below) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 11. 
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• All trades would be subject to daily, or intra-daily, margining which would 
protect the CCP against a member’s default. The margin requirements would 
in turn create economic disincentives against taking on undue risk exposures.53!
• CCPs would be able to impose concentration limits and impose requirements 
to be met by their clearing members. Further, the CCP would have up to date 
information on their clearing members’ exposure thus improving itself and 
regulators’ ability to prepare for and react to situations of stress. In turn, the 
increased transparency, through reporting of prices, quantities and other 
transaction details, lead to enhanced liquidity.54!
• Participants would enjoy the benefits from position and exposure netting 
(multilateral netting), which have the potential of substantially reducing the 
size of individual counterparties’ outstanding obligations relative to bilateral 
arrangements. Instead of posting collateral on several bi-lateral ends, posting 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Yavorsky, OTC derivatives market structure and the credit profiles of wholesale investment banks p. 
149. 
54 Yavorsky, OTC derivatives market structure and the credit profiles of wholesale investment banks p. 
149. 
Illustration of reduction of 
counterparty risk 
 
 
Source: Council of Financial 
Regulators, Central Clearing of 
OTC Derivatives in Australia 
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collateral at a CCP means the need for less assets tied up in margins while still 
increasing stability and reducing credit and counterparty risk.55!!
The attentive reader may have recognised the increased concentration of risk placed 
within the CCP itself. Central clearing does not eliminate the risks, but alters its 
allocation. Naturally, with extended use of central clearing the CCPs will grow to be 
of greater systemic importance. Given the central role of CCPs, any failure by such 
facility would have serious consequences for the financial markets.56 Regulators are 
well aware of this and major measures to mitigate such risks are underway.57 Besides 
being subject to prudential oversight, CCPs will have to implement high standards in 
risk management and stress testing procedures and will be subject to higher capital 
requirements. Taking into account all these risk mitigating measures and the vast 
regulatory oversight, these institutions should be deemed bankruptcy remote and 
hopefully sufficiently robust ready to bear the responsibility of creating stability in 
these markets. 
3 Regulatory Round-tr ip  
Regulatory regimes covering the central clearing requirement, reporting obligation, 
exchange-trading obligation and the imposed higher capital and margin requirements 
on non-centrally cleared products are being proposed and implemented in all 
countries with a substantial OTC derivatives markets, i.e. not only in the G20 
countries. As mentioned above, the OTC derivatives market has up until now been 
largely unregulated and clearing of OTC derivatives has only been executed on a 
smaller scale on a voluntary basis.58 In this section we will look at the regulatory 
landscape governing the coming mandatory central clearing obligation. For the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 IMF, Making OTC Derivatives Safe – A Fresh Look p. 4-5. 
56 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 15. 
57 For instance see BIS, Collateral requirements for mandatory central clearing of over-the-counter 
derivatives. The regulatory reform in this area is progressing in the EU, see EBA, Discussion Paper on 
Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the capital requirements for CCPs. Furthermore, the mere 
fact that approxemately 50 % of the provisions set out in EMIR governs CCPs, is a clear signal of the 
vast efforts in trying to deal with CCPs’ systemic importance. 
58 ISDA, Testimony of Robert Pickel p. 3. Although, the volume of uncleared IRS has declined 40 % 
between 2007 and 2011, this on a voluntary basis. A recent FSB report shows that approx. 35 % of all 
IRS and 12 % of all CDS were cleared through CCPs in December 2011, please refer to FSB, OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms Third Progress Report on Implementation Appendix V.b. p. 59. 
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purpose of this paper, the regulations governing the three remaining G20 objectives 
are left aside.  
 
Framing the objective of this paper, identifying problems for cross-jurisdictional 
participants and CCPs, the focal point when describing the regulations is on 
extraterritorial and protectionist provisions proposed and/or implemented by the 
jurisdictions holding the major OTC derivatives markets. For the purpose of 
providing an understanding of the regulatory framework on the whole, it is 
commendable to focus on four areas of provisions, namely: (i) which participants that 
will be subject to mandatory clearing obligation; (ii) which products that will be 
subject to mandatory clearing obligation; (iii) which cross-border transactions that 
will be subject to mandatory clearing obligation, and; (iv) which clearing facilities 
that may be used by the participants seeking to discharge their clearing obligation. 
The reader should hereby be reminded of the nature of these frameworks as being 
rapidly developing, not narrowed down in detail, nor fully in force to date.  
3.1 Participants Subject to Clearing Obligation 
3.1.1 The US 
The implementation of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) in the US means mandatory clearing obligation 
and obligation to register as a Swap Dealer for all US persons, if not exempted. A US 
person is defined as a legal entity that (a) is organised or incorporated under the laws 
of the US; (b) has a principal place of business in the US; or (c) is directly or 
indirectly owned by one or more US persons that are also responsible for such entity's 
liabilities.59 It is further clarified that non-US branches of US persons are regarded as 
US persons, being the same legal entity. As to non-US subsidiaries of US persons, 
they are regarded as US persons if the US parent is responsible for the subsidiary’s 
liabilities. In addition, non-US persons are obliged to register as Non-US Swap 
Dealers, thus being obliged to clear under Dodd-Frank Act, if the non-US person is 
dealing with a US person to a certain extent (threshold to be decided).60  
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59 CFTC, Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act 
Section II B p. 41218 et seq. 
60 The proposal of cross-border application of the clearing mandate is quite complex, thus simplified in 
this paper for the purpose of providing an understandable structure of the clearing mandate in the US. 
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As indicated, the US regime introduces a new licensing regime for swap dealers, if 
exceeding the relevant threshold the entity must register with the US Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) accordingly and will be subject to the central 
clearing obligation.61 The regime provides for an end-user exemption, allowing non-
financial entities that use swaps solely for hedging purposes or to mitigate 
commercial risk not to clear their contracts.62  
3.1.2 The EU 
As opposed to the Dodd-Frank Act, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation63 
(“EMIR”) does not provide for a new licensing regime for participants. The structure 
of EMIR is somewhat easier to overview. Financial counterparties as defined in 
Article 2 subsection 8, EMIR, would be under the obligation to clear eligible 
transactions.64 Non-financial entities whose positions in qualifying derivatives fall 
below the relevant threshold are exempted, thus end-users are granted a similar 
exemption under EMIR as in the US regime.65 
 
The territorial scope of EMIR is still unclear.  EMIR applies, inter alia, to "financial 
counterparties" which includes investments firms, credit institutions etc. as defined in 
relevant directives.66 A non-EU branch of a EU bank will probably fall within this 
definition as it is the same legal entity as the EU-authorised bank, despite the fact that 
the branch is also licensed and supervised in the jurisdiction in which it 
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Cont’d. For further details, please refer to memorandum by Clifford Chance, CFTC Releases Cross-
Border Swaps Guidance. 
61 CFTC and SEC have steadily been increasing the proposed threshold, first proposed at a level of 
USD 100 million in December 2010. However, CFTC and SEC recently adopted rules defining swap 
dealers as firms conducting swaps of derivatives with a notional value of USD 8 billion a year. See 
Sloan and Hamilton, Regulators Approve $8 Billion Threshold for Swaps Dealers (Bloomberg). 
62 CEA, Sections 2(h)(7) and 3C(g) provide an exception from the mandatory clearing requirement for 
swaps if one of the swap counterparties: (1) is not a financial entity; (2) is using swaps to hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk; and (3) notifies the CFTC (for swaps) or the SEC (for security-based swaps) 
how the counterparty generally meets its financial obligations associated with entering into non-cleared 
swaps. 
63 References are to the text of EMIR published by the Council on 4 July 2012. 
64 'financial counterparty' means an investment firm authorised in accordance with Directive 
2004/39/EC, a credit institution authorised in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC, an insurance 
undertaking authorised in accordance with Directive 73/239/EEC, etc. Please refer to EMIR, Article 
2(8). 
65 Qualifying derivatives here in the meaning of derivatives transactions not used solely for hedging 
purposes or to mitigate commercial risk. EMIR, Article 10(1)(b), in reference to Article 4, provides for 
the end-user exemption. 
66 “financial counterparties” as defined in EMIR, Article 2(8). 
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operates. 67  Similarly, EMIR is possibly applicable to non-EU banks with EU 
branches. 68  In line with other EU legislation such as the Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive69 (“MiFID”), this may be a likely interpretation. The definitions 
of "investment firms", "credit institutions", etc. in the relevant directives are not 
limited to investment firms, credit institutions, etc. that are established or carry out 
business in the EU. For example the definition of “investment firm” in Article 4(1), 
MiFID, includes non-EU entities.70 
3.1.3 Asia Pacific 
In Asia Pacific the EU approach is taken, requiring participants exceeding the relevant 
threshold to clear its trades.71 The extraterritorial reach of the Singapore and Hong 
Kong regimes are not further clarified. Similar end-user exemptions are provided for.  
3.1.4 Key Takeaways 
In summary, the determination of relevant thresholds in relation to entities’ exposure 
in the OTC derivatives market, whether by product or across all product classes, will 
eventually decide which entities that will be subject to the central clearing obligation. 
It is yet to be seen whether regulators across the globe will manage to harmonise their 
thresholds. In terms of extraterritorial aspects, both the EU and the US approaches are 
troublesome. The definition of a US person is broadly extraterritorial. Further, the US 
regime prescribes an obligation for non-US participants to register as a non-US Swap 
Dealer and comply with the US clearing obligation if engaging in swap dealing 
activities with US persons. Together, this brings about a wide application of the US 
clearing prescription, which will affect participants well outside the US’ borders. 
Likewise, the definition of “financial counterparties” in EMIR is broad and likely to 
include branches and possibly legal entities outside the EU.  
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67 This is in line with the US proposal, refer to para. 3.1.1 above. Please also refer to GFMA, FSR, 
IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, clients and 
regulators p. 15, issue 9. 
68 GFMA, FSR, IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, 
clients and regulators p. 15, issue 9. 
69 Directive 2004/39/EC. 
70 For a discussion on EMIR’s extraterritorial reach, please refer to ISDA, Brief on Territorial Scope in 
the Context of EMIR p. 1. 
71 This approach is taken in the Hong Kong and Singapore proposed regulations. HKMA, Consultation 
paper on the proposed regulatory regmie for the over-the-counter derivatives market in Hong Kong 
p.25-26, and MAS, Consultation Paper on Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives p. 8-9. 
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3.2 Products Subject to Clearing Obligation 
3.2.1 The US, The EU and Asia Pacific 
All swaps, broadly defined, are caught by the Dodd-Frank Act. Albeit remaining 
ambiguity of the swap-definition, it is fairly clear that the most common OTC 
derivatives will be included. EMIR includes all asset classes in the OTC derivatives 
market.72 Likewise, regulators in Asia Pacific have proposed fairly broad definitions 
of derivatives caught in the frameworks. However, neither of these regulators has yet 
specified which products that will be subject to the clearing mandate.  
 
All jurisdictions are proposing to use both the “bottom-up” and “top-down” approach 
for the purpose of determining which products to subject to the clearing mandate. 73 
The ”top-down” approach gives the relevant authority the opportunity to initiate the 
process of mandating products, while the ”bottom-up” approach gives eligible CCPs 
the means to initiate the process of mandating products to be centrally cleared by 
applying to the relevant authority.74  
 
At the outset Interest Rate Swaps (“IRS”) denominated in local currencies, Non-
Deliverable Forwards (“NDFs”) and Credit Default Swaps (“CDS”) seem to be 
recognised as products meeting relevant criteria of sufficient level of standardisation, 
depth and liquidity of the market, fair and reliable pricing sources and international 
harmonisation.75 However, it is yet to be seen which products that will be caught by 
the clearing mandate.76 
3.2.2 Key Takeaways 
All jurisdictions are proposing to use both a “top-down” and a “bottom-up” approach 
when determining which products to subject to mandatory clearing requirement. The 
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72 EMIR, Article 2. 
73 EMIR, Article 5, CFTC, Joint Report on International Swap Regulation p. 33-34, MAS, 
Consultation Paper on Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives p. 4 et seq. and HKMA, Consultation 
paper on the proposed regulatory regmie for the over-the-counter derivatives market in Hong Kong p. 
15. 
74 For a more detailed description of the ”bottom-up” and ”top-down” approaches, please refer to 
IOSCO Requirements for Mandatory Clearing p. 14 and 25. 
75 Refer to note 73 above. Further, Gary Gensler, chairman of CFTC, recently said that credit index and 
rate swaps will be the first OTC derivatives to face the clearing mandate, refer to Brush, Credit Index 
and Rate Swaps Will Be First Cleared, Gensler Says (Bloomberg).  
76 For criteria to be assessed when determining eligible products, refer to FSB, Implementing OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms p. 13 et seq. 
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troublesome issue as regards products to be mandated does not lie within the 
extraterritorial reach. In event of non-harmonised rules however, it may drive trading 
of a mandated product in state X to another state Y, where it is not mandated in order 
to escape the clearing obligation. 
3.3 Cross-Boarder Transactions Subject to Clearing Obligation 
3.3.1 The US 
Activities outside the US are caught by Dodd-Frank Act if such activities have a 
“direct and significant connection with activities in, or affect on, commerce of the 
US”, or if it is “necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion”.77 CFTC recently 
released guidance on the extraterritorial reach of the Dodd-Frank Act, unfortunately it 
does not provide the type of bright lines that are essential to those that hope for legal 
certainty.78 As described above however, all transactions executed by US persons 
(broadly defined) will have to clear eligible transactions, also when trading with non-
US persons. Further, non-US Swap Dealers (being non-US persons that transact with 
US persons to an extent reaching above a certain threshold, thus required to register as 
a Swap Dealer), will be obliged to clear transactions executed with non-US 
participants if this entity is guaranteed or supported by a US person. To date it 
remains unclear how to interpret these guidelines on extraterritoriality in detail. But 
by the face of it, it seems like Robert Pickel, CEO, International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, may be right in his statement “…this proposed guideline is 
extremely broad, covering the activities of anyone, anywhere doing business as, or 
with a ‘US Person’”.79  
3.3.2 The EU 
Up until a more recent version of EMIR, as per 19 March 2012, there was no 
provision corresponding to the extraterritorial provision as seen in Dodd-Frank Act 
described above. Under Article 4(1)(v) of the latest text however, "...contracts 
concluded between third country entities that would be subject to the clearing 
obligation if they were established in the EU, shall clear those contracts that have a 
direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU". European Securities and 
Markets Authority (“ESMA”) has not yet specified which contracts that may be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Section 2, Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Section 722 (d). 
78 CFTC, Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act. 
79 ISDA, Testimony of Robert Pickel p.6. 
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considered to have a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU.80 
Furthermore, a transaction between a EU counterparty and any third country entity, 
where the transaction would be subject to clearing obligation if both parties were 
established in the EU, is caught by EMIR.81 In reference to section 3.1.2 above, some 
transactions between non-EU financial counterparties are likely to be caught by the 
clearing prescription in EMIR, as falling within the definition of “financial 
counterparty”. Conclusively, it remains to be seen which effect Article 4(1)(v) will 
have on non-EU participants that are not caught by the definition of “financial 
counterparties”. 
3.3.3 Asia Pacific 
For clearing eligible products the Hong Kong regime proposes to mandate clearing 
for overseas incorporated financial institutions where they are either counterparty to a 
transaction involving a Hong Kong financial institution or where the transaction is 
originated or executed through their Hong Kong branch. A transaction is considered 
“originated or executed” if a person has negotiated, arranged, confirmed or committed 
to the transaction on behalf of himself or any of the counterparties.82  If both 
counterparties are overseas persons however, an exemption will apply if the 
transaction is subject to mandatory clearing under the laws of an acceptable overseas 
jurisdiction and the transaction has been centrally cleared there, or exempted from 
central clearing under those laws. Overseas jurisdictions whose laws are on par with 
international standards and practices in relevant areas will qualify as acceptable.83  
 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) proposes to require transactions to be 
cleared in accordance with Singapore laws, where at least one leg is booked in 
Singapore and either (i) both parties to the transaction are resident or have presence in 
Singapore and are subject to the clearing mandate; or (ii) one party to the contract is 
resident or has presence in Singapore and subject to clearing mandate, and the other 
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80 ESMA is in the process of consulting on this matter, please refer ESMA, Consultation Paper on 
Draft Technical Standards for the Regulation on OTC Derivatives, CCPs and Trade Repositories. 
81 EMIR, Article 4 (1)(iv). 
82 HKMA, Consultation paper on the proposed regulatory regmie for the over-the-counter derivatives 
market in Hong Kong p. 17 and 26. 
83 HKMA, Consultation paper on the proposed regulatory regmie for the over-the-counter derivatives 
market in Hong Kong p. 3-4. 
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party would have been subject to clearing mandate if it had been resident or had 
presence in Singapore.84  
3.3.4 Key Takeaways 
Regulatory regimes in both the US and the EU extend to activities outside respective 
jurisdiction where such activities are connected to and affect the local market. The 
Hong Kong regime is not equally extraterritorial, but wide in its scope including 
transactions originated or executed trough an overseas financial institution’s Hong 
Kong branch. Singapore has the least extraterritorial proposal, only requiring 
transactions where at least one leg is booked in Singapore to be cleared and does not 
propose to catch any transactions conducted between two third country entities under 
any circumstances. Aside form the problems caused by these extraterritorial 
provisions itself, the remaining uncertainty as to which transactions that actually will 
be caught under the regimes respectively causes great distress and incurs costs for 
participants and CCPs, especially considering the rapidly approaching deadline for 
implementation end 2012.85 
3.4 Eligible CCPs 
3.4.1 The US 
Swaps designated by CFTC as clearable and accepted by a clearing house for 
clearing, are to be cleared through a derivatives clearing organisation (“DCO”).86 
Thus, an entity acting as a CCP for swaps must be registered with CFTC as a DCO if 
not exempted (for clarity, a DCO is a US incorporated CCP). CFTC may exempt, 
conditionally or unconditionally, a foreign CCP from the requirement of holding 
DCO-status, if it is subject to comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation 
in its home country.87 However, the US regulators have not yet presented to what 
extent this exemption would apply and what areas to assess when determining 
whether to allow a foreign CCP, not holding DCO-status, to clear trades caught by the 
US clearing obligation. Consequently, currently the only way of securing ability for 
CCPs to clear swaps for US persons or non-US Swap Dealers is to be registered as a 
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84 MAS, Consultation Paper on Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives p. 7. 
85 ISDA, Testimony of Robert Pickel p. 1. 
86 Dodd-Frank Act, Section 723(a). 
87 Dodd-Frank Act, Section 725(b). 
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DCO, and US persons or non-US Swap Dealers can only meet the clearing obligation 
by clearing through a DCO.  
3.4.2 The EU 
Pursuant to EMIR, the clearing obligation is met if the eligible contracts are cleared 
through designated clearing houses, i.e. either through a EU CCP authorised by 
relevant national (EU member state) authority or through a third country CCP 
recognised by the ESMA. A CCP established in a third country (i.e. outside the EU) 
may provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in 
the EU only if the CCP is recognised by ESMA. Pursuant to article 25, EMIR, ESMA 
may recognise a third country CCP if (i) the Commission has adopted an 
implementing act; (ii)! the CCP is authorised in the relevant third country, and is 
subject to, effective supervision and enforcement ensuring a full compliance with the 
prudential requirements applicable in that third country; (iii) cooperation 
arrangements have been established between ESMA and relevant foreign authority; 
and (iv) that the relevant third country is considered as having equivalent AML/CFT88 
systems to the EU. The Commission may adopt an implementing act if (a) the CCP 
authorised in that third country complies with legally binding requirements which are 
equivalent to the requirements set out under EMIR; (b)! that the CCP is subject to 
effective supervision and enforcement in that third country on an ongoing basis; and 
(c) that the legal framework of that third country provides for an effective equivalent 
system for the recognition of CCPs authorised under third country legal regimes.  
 
Of relevance in this regard is when a clearing member or trading venue is regarded as 
established in the EU. If a non-EU CCP’s participants are established in the EU, the 
CCP must be recognised by ESMA in order to clear for their EU-established 
participants. ESMA has not yet provided any clarity on this matter, but frights are that 
not only firms incorporated in EU is regarded as established, but also: 
(i) Firms incorporated outside the EU, that have a branch in the EU and clear 
through the EU branch; 
(ii) Firms incorporated outside the EU, with a branch in the EU, but clears 
through the non-EU establishment; and 
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88 Anti-money Laundering /Combating the Financing of Terrorism. 
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(iii) Firms incorporated in the EU, with a branch outside the EU and clears 
through the non-EU branch.89 
Recital 59, EMIR, states that "in order not to hamper the further development of 
crossborder investment management business in the Union, a third country CCP 
providing services to clients established in the Union through a clearing member 
established in a third country, should not have to be recognised by ESMA". The 
International Swap and Derivatives Association (”ISDA”) promotes that recital 59 
indicates that the legislative intent was to allow non-EU CCPs to provide clearing 
services outside the EU. 90  However, recital 59 only mentions client clearing. 
Furthermore, what is meant by the term "established" is not set out and there are no 
references to branches. Conclusively, it remains unclear to what extent recital 59 
provides for an actual relief.  
3.4.3 Asia Pacific 
In Hong Kong it is proposed that only a recognised clearing house (“RCH”) or an 
automated trading services (“ATS”) provider (authorised under Hong Kong law) 
should be permitted to be designated as a CCP for the purpose of mandatory clearing 
obligation. The ATS regime is described as suited for overseas CCPs who wish to 
provide services in the Hong Kong market, since it is more flexible and primarily 
governed by the laws in the home jurisdiction.91 The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(“HKMA”) has, at least not yet, proposed any framework for recognition of overseas 
clearing houses who wish to clear trades caught by the Hong Kong clearing 
obligation, but instead would require the overseas CCP to be authorised as an ATS 
under Hong Kong laws. Notably, transactions executed between two overseas entities, 
would not be caught by the clearing mandate in Hong Kong provided that the 
transaction is cleared in an acceptable jurisdiction, acceptable as in on par with 
international standards. By way of speculation, this may be an indication of HKMA 
considering structuring their recognition regime of overseas CCPs in a similar way, 
i.e. to assess overseas CCPs in relation to international standards rather than in 
relation to Hong Kong requirements. That is, if HKMA will provide for a regime 
recognising overseas CCPs whatsoever. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 ISDA, Concerns regarding the Application of Article 25(1) EMIR p.3. 
90 ISDA, Concerns regarding the Application of Article 25(1) EMIR p.4. 
91 HKMA, Consultation paper on the proposed regulatory regmie for the over-the-counter derivatives 
market in Hong Kong p. 4 and 33. 
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The Hong Kong regulator has not yet come to any conclusion whether they find it 
suitable to only designate domestic CCPs to clear transactions as regards systemically 
important products subject to mandatory clearing under Hong Kong law. 92 
Considering resent development, with Australia withdrawing their proposal to require 
local clearing and the heavy criticism relating to location requirement, Hong Kong 
regulators will probably pull back on this proposal.93 
 
In its consultation paper the MAS introduces a new authorisation regime for 
recognition of overseas clearing facilities in Singapore. Clearing eligible contracts 
must be cleared through either an approved clearing house under Singapore law or 
through an overseas recognised clearing house. 94  MAS may, when considering 
recognising an overseas clearing facility, have regard to whether the applicant CCP is 
“…subject to requirements and supervision comparable, in the degree to which the 
objectives specified in section 47 are achieved, to the requirements and supervision to 
which approved clearing houses and recognised clearing houses are subject under 
this Act”.95 The objectives of section 47 are (a) to promote safe and efficient clearing 
facilities; and (b) to reduce systemic risk. Furthermore, MAS envisages the possible 
need for imposing a requirement on overseas clearing houses to establish presence in 
Singapore to be regulated as a local approved clearing house, but only limit this to 
cases where it may not be sufficient to place reliance on the home regulator of 
overseas clearing houses.  
 
In its June 2011 consultation paper, the Australian regulator proposed to mandate 
clearing through an Australian domiciled CCP as regards products on a systemically 
important market, which in the case of Australia means clearing of AUD-
denominated interest rate derivatives. 96 In recent developments however, the 
Australian regulator has stepped back on this point and allows clearing elsewhere for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 HKMA, Consultation paper on the proposed regulatory regmie for the over-the-counter derivatives 
market in Hong Kong p. 33. 
93 ”location requirement” refers to a requirement to clear a specific product through a domestic clearing 
house, under all circumstances, i.e. exemptions or recognition regimes for overseas CCPs would be 
irrelevant.  
94 MAS, Consultation Paper on Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives p. 31 et seq. 
95 MAS, New Part IIA of SFA, Section 52(2)(b). 
96 Council of Financial Regulators, Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives in Australia p. 37. 
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these products. As a matter of fact, the Australian regulator leaves the whole clearing 
mandate open, for the market participants to clear products at their own discretion but 
keeps the gun loaded ready to impose clearing obligation in due course.97 Among 
other things, the newly issued paper indicates that in some circumstances Australian 
regulators may ultimately insist on particular entities establishing presence in 
Australia in order to be granted allowance to carry out the function of a CCP.98 
3.4.4 Key Takeaways 
Evidences are that all jurisdictions are adopting protectionist approaches, taking 
Australia apart, requiring clearing mandated transactions to be cleared through 
designated clearing houses. Nevertheless, regulators recognise the need for either an 
exemption for or recognition of overseas CCPs.  
 
The EU, the US and Singapore regulators are proposing to only recognise overseas 
CCPs that are subject to equivalent or comparable requirements and supervision in 
relation to domestic legislation. However, it is possible to recognise slight differences 
between the EU proposal and the Singapore proposal (which are the only jurisdictions 
examined here that have proposed recognition regimes in a bit more detailed way). 
EMIR requires overseas CCPs to be subject to requirements equivalent to EMIR in 
order to be eligible for recognition. Singapore proposal prescribes that the applicant 
CCP should be subject to comparable requirement to Singapore law, but possibly 
through an effect-based approach (“in the degree to which the objectives specified in 
section 47 are achieved”). As noted above, Hong Kong has not proposed a 
recognition regime for overseas CCPs to date. However, more interestingly, the Hong 
Kong proposal makes references to international standards when determining if 
foreign jurisdictions are deemed acceptable. Why the Singapore proposed recognition 
regime of possibly being effect-based and the Hong Kong proposal as referring to 
international standards (albeit not in relation to recognition of overseas CCPs) are of 
relevance will be analysed in Part III below. ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 The Treasury, Implementation of a framework for Australia's G20 over-the-counter derivatives 
commitments p. ix-x.  
98 Japan is mandating domestic clearing as regards credit default swaps referring to an index of iTraxx 
Japan. Furthermore, India, China and South Korea will probably either partly of fully impose a location 
requirement. See Noyes, How Asia is progressing towards OTC clearing deadline (Asia Risk) and 
FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms Third Progress Report on Implementation p. 14 and 85. 
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PART II - IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS 
CAUSED 
4 Identif ication of Problems 
To regulate an international market on a national basis naturally brings difficulties in 
terms of conflicting laws and possible regulatory arbitrage. The extraterritorial and 
protectionist provisions force participants to take costly and troublesome actions in 
complying with multiple regulatory regimes. The CCPs are facing a brand new 
clearing market, which brings great obstacles to overcome in order to keep their 
current international members and customers, but also new business opportunities.  
 
This Part II identifies problems caused by the provisions presented in Part I above. 
For clarity, problems caused for participants and CCPs will be analysed separately. 
Subsequently these problems will be applied to the intended benefits from central 
clearing, thus an account of their impact on the market. Lastly, analysis as to why 
regulators insist on implementing these rules albeit the problems caused follows. This 
insight is relevant reaching the final Part III of this paper, setting out proposed 
solutions to the problems identified.  !
For ease of assessment and overview, one may categorise extraterritorial and 
protectionist provisions as follows: 
(1) “Extraterritorial provisions” refers to provisions that are broad in its scope, 
requiring compliance by participants as regards transactions that do not have 
their main origin or course of business in the jurisdiction in question. 
Extraterritorial provisions are, by way of example, the provisions seen in 
EMIR and Dodd-Frank Act, which require clearing of transactions concluded 
by third country branches and subsidiaries to EU/US incorporated entities and 
by third country entities with branches in the EU/US. Also the Hong Kong 
proposal of catching transactions originated or executed through a Hong Kong 
branch would belong in this category.  
(2) “Protectionist provisions” refers to provisions that show lack of reliance on 
foreign regulators and urges participants to stay within the jurisdiction to clear 
their trades. For the purpose of this paper, the most predominant example is 
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the provisions requiring participants to clear its transactions through specific 
clearing houses without efficient and well-balanced recognition regimes.  
4.1 Participant Perspective 
The combination of extraterritorial provisions and protectionist provisions means 
problems for participants trading on a cross-border basis. Creating an understanding 
of the problems caused, it is beneficial visualising two scenarios as follows: 
  
Scenario 1  
BankA is a participant with international presence, incorporated in the US 
with a branch in Singapore. BankB is a Hong Kong-incorporated bank with a 
branch in London. Both BankA and BankB have large exposures in the OTC 
derivatives market thus exceeding relevant thresholds and consequently are 
subject to the central clearing mandate in all jurisdictions. BankA and BankB 
are about to execute a transaction as regards USD IRS. USD IRS is a product 
likely to be subject to the clearing mandate in all jurisdictions in this example. 
The transaction is negotiated through BankA’s Singapore branch and BankB’s 
head office in Hong Kong. One leg of the transaction is booked in Singapore 
(BankA) and one in London (BankB). Where and pursuant to which laws 
should the transaction be cleared? 
 
• BankA is incorporated in the US, why BankA and also its branch must 
comply with Dodd-Frank Act, which means the need to register 
accordingly and clear all its eligible swaps through a DCO (or through 
an overseas exempted CCP). In addition, since the transaction is 
booked in Singapore, BankA’s Singapore branch would also need to 
comply with the frameworks set out in Singapore, this means that the 
transaction must be cleared by an approved clearing house in 
Singapore or by a recognised overseas clearing house. 
• BankB is incorporated in Hong Kong, and even if the transaction is 
booked in London, it is still negotiated by the Hong Kong office, why 
the transaction is caught by the Hong Kong regime and must be 
cleared through a clearing house or an automated trading services 
provider authorised under Hong Kong law. At the same time, the 
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London branch books the transaction, thus probably being subject to 
EMIR’s requirement of clearing either through a EU CCP or through a 
by ESMA recognised overseas clearing house.  
 
As seen, this transaction would be caught in four different jurisdictions, all 
requiring them to comply with each law respectively. It may not be very likely 
that participants would structure their transactions like this, but the scenario 
above sheds light on the complexity of being caught in several jurisdictions 
imposing protectionist provisions. A simpler, and likely, scenario would be 
that a EU branch of an US-incorporated bank, executes trades with a EU bank. 
The same principles apply, but only involve two jurisdictions. Scenario 1 
illustrates the impossibility of complying with several clearing requirements 
simultaneously. 
 
Scenario 2 
A Singapore Bank trades eligible OTC contracts with both a US-incorporated 
bank and with a EU-incorporated bank. The Singapore bank would then be 
subject to three regulatory regimes, unless it structures its trades so it does not 
get caught by the Singapore regime, i.e. if booking the transaction abroad. The 
Singapore bank would then need to be a clearing member to a CCP in the US 
and a CCP in the EU. Scenario 2 illustrates the need of holding multiple 
clearing memberships. 
 
The reader should hereby be reminded that it is only possible to clear a transaction 
through one CCP.99 Obviously then, the participants cannot comply by clearing a 
transaction in all jurisdictions at the same time. In the scenarios above two structural 
problems are identified: 
(a) When a single transaction is caught in several jurisdictions, it is impossible 
to execute the transaction in compliance with several regulatory regimes. 
This requires the involved participants to structure their trade differently, 
so that the transaction only is caught in one jurisdiction.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 This given the absence of interoperability between clearing houses as regards clearing of OTC 
derivatives. Allowing interoperability as an option is being discussed in Part III of this paper. 
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(b) When each transaction is caught in one jurisdiction, but the participants 
trade with several counterparties that are caught in different jurisdictions, 
participants are required to become clearing members or set up client 
clearing arrangements with multiple CCPs. 
4.1.1 Re-structuring of Transactions 
This problem (refer to Scenario 1, problem (a) above) encourages participants to 
make venue choices based on avoidance of the clearing mandate and administrative 
complexity, potentially reducing the focus upon execution quality and causes 
fragmentation of international markets.100 It would also be impossible for some 
participants to structure their trades accordingly, bearing in mind the broad 
extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank and EMIR. In such case, the participants would 
have to refrain from trading with each other. Conclusively, participants would then 
have fewer potential counterparties to trade with, which would hamper the trading 
volume thus reduce the liquidity.101 Even if the participants would be able to structure 
their transaction to only be caught in one jurisdiction, they would still need to hold 
multiple clearing memberships if wanting to trade with several counterparties from 
different jurisdictions.  
4.1.2 Multiple Clearing Memberships 
As described above, a participant must be a clearing member or have client clearing 
arrangements in place in order to clear its trades with a CCP.102 In a regulatory 
environment where jurisdictions are requiring eligible transactions to be cleared 
through a designated clearing house, this in turn requires participants to become 
clearing members or be clients to designated CCPs. The reason why the proposed 
regulations would as an effect oblige participants to be members/clients to multiple 
CCPs is the nature of this market as consisting of transactions executed on a cross-
border basis (refer to scenario 2, problem (b) above). In other words, if the CCPs are 
not allowed to offer its services in multiple jurisdictions, participants on their side 
must become members of multiple CCPs in various markets, or set up client clearing 
arrangements with clearing members around the globe.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 GFMA, FSR, IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, 
clients and regulators p. 6.!
101 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 42. 
102 Please refer to paras. 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 above. 
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4.1.2.1 Drawbacks of Holding Multiple Clearing Memberships 
So, what are the downsides of holding multiple clearing memberships? Being a 
clearing member entails the need to fulfil high admittance requirement, including 
being licenced by relevant authority, and continuously comply with the CCP’s 
clearing rules. This incurs costs and operational burdens.103 The need for holding 
multiple clearing memberships naturally increases these costs.  
 
One of the clear benefits from central clearing from a participant perspective is the 
possibility of multilateral netting, which reduces the need to post collateral on several 
bilateral ends. The extraterritorial and protectionist approaches fragments the market 
and forces participants to split up their portfolios to be cleared through different 
CCPs, thus the benefit from netting gets lost.  
 
The need to post collateral to multiple CCPs means that more liquid assets are tied up 
in CCP margins. Posting of various margins would also be increasingly burdensome 
given the enhanced requirements on type of collateral accepted, namely mainly cash 
or government securities.104 On this note, it is also relevant to acknowledge the new 
(proposed) requirements on participants with respect to their OTC derivatives 
transactions not being centrally cleared. Posting of initial margin, variation margin 
and possibly increased capital requirements will be required on those transactions as 
well.105 An overall increased obligation to post margins would constrain participants 
and might render in decreased trading activity thus reduced liquidity. In addition, 
participants that must meet large margin calls may respond by selling assets and 
reducing its positions in ways that may exacerbate the price changes that caused the 
initial margin calls. If a participant is subject to large margin calls from several CCPs, 
this effect could be detrimental not only to the participant but also destabilising price 
movement and liquidity.106  
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103 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 42. 
104 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 8. By way of example, the 
requirement of these types of collateral is proposed in the EU, refer to ESMA, Discussion Paper Draft 
Technical Standards for the Regulation on OTC Derivatives, CCPs and Trade Repositories p. 32-33. 
105 Please refer to para. 2.1 above. In the EU it is proposed that only the same type of collateral posted 
with CCPs should be allowed as collateral in bilateral transactions, refer to the ESAs, Joint Discussion 
Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on risk mitigation techniques p. 17, and ESMA, 
Discussion Paper Draft Technical Standards for the Regulation on OTC Derivatives, CCPs and Trade 
Repositories p. 32-33. 
106 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 12. 
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Recalling the possibility to clear its transaction as a client through a clearing member 
instead of holding multiple clearing memberships, might at a first glace seem to solve 
the problems imposed. This assumption may be correct in relation to some aspects, 
but client clearing is connected to other drawbacks.  
 
A client clearing arrangement is not equally regulated by the CCP, since the CCP do 
not liaise with the client directly, but normally only through a clearing member. In 
other words, the client is not directly obligated to follow the clearing rules or 
admittance requirements imposed by the CCP. However, the regulatory development 
shows evidence of CCPs imposing requirements on their clearing members to in turn 
require their clients to meet certain criteria as to financial standards and risk 
management etc.107 Thus clients are obligated to comply with various requirements, 
which is of course costly especially if setting up several client clearing arrangements.  
 
Just as a clearing member, a client must post collateral in relation to their exposure 
and suffers the same drawbacks as clearing members in relation to lost netting 
benefits and increased posting of collateral if required to clear through multiple CCPs.  
 
Moreover, compared to clearing members’, the clients’ collateral may not be equally 
protected. If a client defaults, and the clearing member cannot cover the loss, the CCP 
can utilise the customer margins of non-defaulting customers (this as opposed to 
using surviving clearing members’ collateral, which generally is not allowed), if the 
collateral is held in omnibus customer accounts. To date it is common that clients’ 
collateral is comingled, even though there is a call for finer segregation also for the 
clients’ collateral. If regulators and CCPs adopt individual segregation of customer 
accounts, the clients may be afforded greater protection, although to a higher cost. 
Finer segregation is more costly, and bankruptcy remote segregation typically 
requires the payment of additional fees.108 In addition to the posting of collateral with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 LCH.Clearnet recently introduced new client clearing rules, whereby the client will be subject to the 
full rulebook, via obligating the clearing member to contract accordingly with its clients, refer to 
LCH.Clearnet, FCM Regulations of the Clearing House, Regulation 4, available at: 
www.lchclearnet.com/Images/FCM%20Regulations_tcm6-57089.pdf. Also SGX-DC is currently 
developing a new client clearing framework, imposing requirements on the clients. 
108 Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p. 30. 
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the CCP, the use of an intermediary (the clearing member) means additional fees and 
increased counterparty risk against the clearing member.  
4.1.3 Key Takeaways 
There are two main areas of problems brought about by the regulatory regimes 
affecting the participants. Firstly, the extraterritorial and protectionist approaches 
fragment the markets and force participants to structure their trading to only get 
caught by a limited number of jurisdictions, and only one jurisdiction per transaction. 
Secondly, the protectionist approaches require participants to clear with designated 
clearinghouses, thus requiring them to become members or clients to multiple 
clearing houses if wishing to trade with participants from other jurisdictions. As will 
be seen in Part III, there are ways to mitigate these problems through well-balanced 
recognition regimes and the possibility of interoperability between CCPs.  
4.2 CCP Perspective 
The mandatory clearing obligations being implemented around the globe means 
increased and new business opportunities for CCPs, but in a never before seen 
competitive environment.109 On the other hand, the protectionist approaches cause 
CCPs having international members and clients great distress in trying to keep their 
business with these members.  
 
Scenario 3 
A US participant clearing its positions through a Singapore CCP (either as a 
member or a client), would after the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act 
clearing mandate, not be able to meet its clearing obligation by clearing 
through the Singapore CCP. The US participant would need to clear through a 
DCO (or an exempt DCO). Conclusively, the Singapore CCP would need to 
apply and be granted DCO-status in order to keep its business with the US 
participant.110 
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109 The new regulations have vast impacts on CCPs, interesting reading on the subject is Harrison, 
Clearing at the Crossroads. 
110 The same principle would apply if the Singapore CCP whished to clear for a EU participant, thus 
being forced to get recognised by ESMA. 
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4.2.1 Multiple Clearing Memberships 
Even though it is the participants that suffer the greatest loss of possibly being 
obligated to hold multiple clearing memberships, this also affects the CCPs. 
Fragmentation of markets, where participants need to split up their portfolios and 
clear through several CCPs may incur increased risks and larger exposure to the CCP. 
In particular, a CCP can contribute to the stability of the financial system by 
facilitating efficient, coordinated replacement of defaulted position. This is managed 
through netting.111 If a CCP’s clearing member cannot clear all its trades through that 
CCP, the CCP would not be able to net the participant’s exposure to the same extent 
thus possibly face increased costs and risks of position replacement in event of the 
participant’s default.112  
 
Another important feature of the CCP is the information and concentration of risk 
monitoring. CCPs are able to impose concentration limits on their clearing members. 
Highly concentrated positions pose particularly a great risk for CCPs, since price 
movements in that product class may impose large losses, making a default more 
likely. Moreover, it is more difficult to replace concentrated positions. It is therefore 
important for a CCP to closely monitor concentration of positions. If a member needs 
to clear the same class of products through several CCPs, the monitoring of that 
member’s exposure in a product class is more troublesome to carry out.  
4.2.2 Recognition Projects without Certain Outcomes 
In order for e.g. a clearing member (who is caught by Dodd-Frank Act) to a Singapore 
CCP to fulfil the clearing requirement pursuant to US regulations, the clearing 
member must clear its trades through a DCO in the US or through an exempt DCO. 
Lacking of set out regimes for how the exemption will apply, clearing houses who 
wish to continue clearing their US costumers’ transactions must by the time of 
implementation of the US clearing mandate be an approved DCO. In the EU, a 
recognition regime is proposed requiring equivalence to EMIR standards for 
recognition. However, the proposed recognition regime is at an immature stage 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Please refer to para. 2.2.6 above. 
112 C. Pirrong, University of Houston The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice p 42. 
!! $%!
without any details provided. At the moment therefore, CCPs are left in limbo not 
knowing what will be required and when or if they can be recognised.113 
 
The current confusion and uncertainty as to how rules will apply and how they will 
calibrate with other jurisdictions’ laws impose great costs on CCPs.114 Among other 
measures taken in trying to stay ahead and be in compliance, non-US CCPs apply to 
CFTC for grant of DCO-status.115 The project of applying for becoming a DCO in the 
US means an overwhelming amount of work for a CCP. In these immature regimes, 
where neither the foreign regulator, the home regulator or the applying clearing house 
knows/have yet decided what is required by the applicant CCP, vast resources are put 
into project without certainty of outcome or thorough knowledge of rules to comply 
with. After all, this is a business decision where the CCP in question must decide 
whether it is worthwhile putting vast resources into projects without certain outcomes, 
but nevertheless an interesting effect of the extraterritorial provisions.  
4.2.3 Higher Standards 
A higher level of competition between clearinghouses is to expect. Since the 
extraterritorial and protectionist approaches force CCPs to get established or 
recognised in foreign jurisdictions this means that, in accordance with proposed 
recognition regimes, these CCPs must comply with standards imposed in its home 
jurisdiction and additionally in for example the EU (if seeking to get recognised in the 
EU). In order to ensure compliance the CCP must always take on the higher of the 
two standards. Higher standards are equivalent to higher costs. Recognising the 
likeliness of participants not choosing a CCP because of its level of standards and 
relevant regulatory platform, but rather where the cost benefits are highest, a CCP that 
has to comply with several different requirements will naturally not be able to offer 
the same competitive clearing fees etc. Thus, an un-level playing field is created. 
From a regulatory perspective it might be tempting to impose lower standards than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Please refer to Noyes, How Asia is progressing towards OTC clearing deadline (Asia Risk). 
114 ISDA, Testimony of Robert Pickel p. 1. 
115 For example SGX-DC currently applies to CFTC to become a DCO and to UK SFA to be 
recognised as an overseas clearing house. As opposed to the US, UK has a recognition regime in place. 
Although, once EMIR takes effect, the UK recognised clearing houses will need to be recognised 
pursuant to EMIR. Clearing houses currently applying for recognition under the UK regime hope for 
some kind of grandfathering treatment into the EU market once EMIR takes effect. Notably, it is 
unclear whether such grandfathering actually will mean that applying CCPs will save resources, but at 
least they will be able to continue clearing for its EU members and customers. 
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motivated from a risk management perspective, to enable the local CCPs to be 
competitive on an international market. A regulatory race to the bottom would not 
only undermine the G20 objectives but also incur risks in the market place. Taken 
together, differences in CCP requirements may lead to regulatory arbitrage and 
competitive advantages not based on more efficient resource allocation or better 
strategic decisions, but on government fiat. 
4.2.4 Equivalence in Standards 
As seen above, EMIR is requiring a CCP to be subject to equivalent requirements as 
set out in EMIR in order to be eligible for recognition. Since the EU is leading the 
way in the regulatory space, there is a risk that the US and other jurisdictions will 
require the same level of comparability, i.e. equivalence in relation to domestic laws. 
This is causing problems for the CCPs, since they for recognition do not only have to 
show that they have sufficiently high standards in relation to certain criteria, but that 
the requirements imposed on the CCP are equivalent to the requirements set out in a 
foreign jurisdiction.  
 
Due to differences in local markets and legal traditions it might be difficult to provide 
for equivalent requirements as set out in the EU and US regimes, either from the 
clearing house or from the home regulator’s perspective, which would prevent CCPs 
domiciled in such jurisdictions to be recognised abroad. Furthermore, the “easy” 
solution of always taking on the higher of the two standards may not solve the 
problem, since requirements of local law may make it impossible for regulations 
identical to e.g. EMIR to be imposed.116 
4.2.5 Key Takeaways 
The problems present in relation to participants as being required to hold multiple 
clearing memberships/client arrangements, have in many ways corresponding 
negative effects on CCPs as well. Addressing the high-level recognition regimes 
proposed to date, regulators are requiring the foreign CCP to comply with legally 
binding requirements, which are equivalent or comparable to the requirements set out 
in the country recognising the CCP. That these regimes are referring to national 
legislation and require high level of compliance, will cause CCPs seeking to get !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 GFMA, FSR, IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, 
clients and regulators p. 10. 
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recognised great distress in complying with different jurisdictions’ set of legislation. 
Furthermore, depending on country of origin, some CCPs may not be able to fulfil 
requirements as set out in for example the EU or US. As will be seen in Part III, well-
balanced recognition regimes and the possibility of interoperability between CCPs 
could be the solution also to the problems CCPs are facing.  
4.3 Market Perspective 
The effects that the extraterritorial and protectionist approaches have on the 
participants and CCPs naturally have consequences also for the market. The best way 
of showing this is to reconnect these problems identified to the intended benefits from 
central counterparty clearing.117  
• The multiple bi-lateral relationships would be replaced with a single 
relationship with the CCP. The use of a CCP is intended to increase the 
probability of contractual obligations being fulfilled: If a CCP’s clearing 
members have to split their portfolios and clear through multiple clearing 
houses, the CCP’s exposure may be larger due to reduced netting possibilities. 
In turn, this may affect the CCP’s ability to guarantee performance, which 
could entail systemic risk. 
• All trades would be subject to daily, or intra-daily, margining which would 
protect the CCP against a member’s default. The margin requirements would 
also create economic disincentives against taking on undue risk exposures: If 
participants are forced to tie up too much liquid assets in collateral in 
different CCPs, this would hamper the trading activity and large margin calls 
from several ends may drive participants to sell, thus being detrimental to 
price changes and liquidity. !
• CCPs would be able to impose concentration limits and impose requirements 
to be met by their clearing members. Further, the CCP would have up to date 
information on their clearing members’ exposure thus improving itself and 
regulators’ ability to prepare for and react to situations of stress. In turn, the 
increased transparency, through reporting of prices, quantities and other 
transaction details, lead to enhanced liquidity: The need for clearing through 
several CCPs would possibly reduce the ability to assess concentration of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Please refer to para. 2.2.7 above. 
!! $(!
positions which brings about greater risk to the CCP. Further, if information 
must be obtained from multiple CCPs to construct a complete map of 
exposures and connections this might be challenging when large dealers clear 
through CCPs across multiple jurisdictions, which would reduce authorities’ 
ability to efficiently supervise the market.118!
• Participants would enjoy the benefits from position and exposure netting 
(multilateral netting), which have the potential of substantially reducing the 
size of individual counterparties’ outstanding obligations relative to bilateral 
arrangements. Instead of posting collateral on several bi-lateral ends, posting 
collateral at a CCP means the need for less assets tied up in margins while still 
increasing stability and reducing credit and counterparty risk: Multiple 
clearing memberships reduce the potential of netting benefits, and increase 
the amount of liquid assets tied up in margins.119 This may fragment the 
markets and lead to less liquidity.!
 
Extraterritorial and protectionist approaches impose the need for participants and 
CCPs to be in compliance with several regulatory regimes, if operating on an 
international basis. As long as this in itself benefits the fulfilment of creating stability 
and resilience in the OTC market, it might be worthwhile. However, as been seen 
above, the problems participants and CCPs are facing, also brings about detrimental 
effects to the market.  
 
From a domestic perspective these regulations will most likely promote the intended 
benefits from CCP clearing, contributing to achieving the G20 objectives. Coming 
from an international perspective however, it is evident that the global characteristic 
of the OTC derivatives market has been given too little recognition.120 It is now 
relevant to pay attention to why regulators have insisted on adopting the domestic, 
extraterritorial and protectionist approach when regulating this market. 
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119 IMF, Making OTC Derivatives Safe – A Fresh Look p. 4-5.!
120 GFMA, FSR, IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, 
clients and regulators p. 6. 
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4.4 Reasons for Protectionist and Extraterritorial Approaches 
Evidences are that regulators take on rather extraterritorial and protectionist 
approaches when regulating the OTC derivatives market. Proposed clearing mandates 
are generally wide in its scope with requirements on where to clear the trades. There 
are several reasons why regulators impose extraterritorial and protectionist 
approaches, in detail the following would be set forward: 
 
(i) Firstly, recognising the international characteristic of the OTC market, 
regulators also realise foreign participants’ possible impact on the local 
market, why they want to regulate them as well.121 This may be regarded 
as a rather natural attitude in its endeavour to gain control over the 
financial market, but nevertheless vastly troublesome. 
(ii) Secondly, there is a competitive element to it.! Naturally, each market 
wants to increase or at least keep their market share in the clearing 
business. Clearing facilities are closely connected to trading facilities. In a 
regulatory environment where regulators bound by G20 objectives will 
require on-exchange trading and clearing to a greater extent, each market 
wants to compete and foster growth in their market. In order to guard itself 
against the clearing and trading being moved elsewhere, regulators may 
feel urged to impose extraterritorial and protectionist provisions. Imagine a 
jurisdiction only requiring participants that are booking its trade in the 
relevant jurisdiction to clear its trades in accordance with the local 
regulation. Participants of such regime are likely to clear its trades 
elsewhere, where the scope of the clearing mandate is broader thus 
requiring their compliance anyway. 
(iii) Thirdly, allowing offshore clearing means that the home regulator would 
neither have the primary oversight over such CCP, nor primary 
involvement in a situation of default. The home regulator’s lack of ability 
to directly influence default resolution processes by offshore CCPs and the 
home regulator’s lack of presence and control as a potential lender of last 
resort in a CCP default, introduce risks to the local market. Having a 
domestic authority as the primary regulator of the CCP operating in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms Third Progress Report on Implementation p.37. 
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domestic market provides superior policy outcomes with respect to clarity, 
transparency and accountability. Moreover, the regulator’s capacity to 
intervene in crisis management scenarios is likely to be more 
straightforward with regards to a local CCP.122 
(iv) Finally, while the OTC derivatives market is global, clearing houses are 
local, grounded in local regulations and insolvency laws. Differences in 
insolvency laws with respect to collateral posted with CCPs, cause 
uncertainty as to whether local participants’ collateral would be protected 
abroad and whether foreign participants’ collateral posted in a local CCP 
would be at risk due to foreign insolvency proceeding. This uncertainty 
and lack of ability to put trust in foreign CCPs default management rules, 
makes regulators inclined to increase their control and impose protectionist 
provisions.123 !
As seen above it is, at least to some extent, understandable why regulators impose 
extraterritorial and protectionist provisions. However, the lack of reliance on 
foreign regulators is less legitimate. If regulators could consider a change in this 
approach, the solutions proposed in the following would face greater prospects of 
becoming reality.  !  
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122 IOSCO, Requirements for Mandatory Clearing p. 39.  
123 Please refer to para. 5.3.4.2 below for an account of possible differences in insolvency laws causing 
CCPs problems. 
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PART III  – PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND WAYS 
TO MITIGATE PROBLEMS CAUSED 
5. Solutions 
There is no simple answer to the question of how to resolve the critical issues pointed 
out above. Regulating an international market on a national basis inevitably brings 
problems for international stakeholders. Worth noting is that regulations relating to 
the extraterritorial scope of the clearing mandate only account for a narrow area of 
law as being a smaller part of the whole OTC reform. Extraterritorial provisions 
relating to on-exchange trading, capital requirements and reporting to trade 
repositories etc. are equally troublesome. Thus, coming from a broader perspective, 
which is the reality for most participants, one can barely imagine how many obstacles 
there are to overcome all in all before a stable international financial market in the 
OTC derivatives space may face daylight. 
5.1 International Harmonisation 
The benefit from international harmonisation does not need detailed clarification. 
Simply, if jurisdictions impose equivalent provisions in all respects, neither 
participants nor CCPs would face difficulties in complying with different regulatory 
regimes.124  
 
There has been a frenetic activity among international bodies and stakeholders 
seeking to set out international standards and recommendations to regulators across 
the globe. The International Organization of Securities Commission (“IOSCO”), 
holds the highest authority in the international regulatory space and has issued a 
number of reports containing international standards and recommendations for 
implementation of mandatory central clearing.125 IOSCO’s goal is to “cooperate in 
developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally recognised and 
consistent standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect 
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124 This still provided that all regimes allowed for recognition of overseas CCPs, otherwise participants 
would have to clear through several CCPs anyway.  
125 Among others, see: IOSCO, Requirements for Mandatory Clearing, IOSCO, Report on Trading of 
OTC Derivatives and IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. 
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investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address 
systemic risks…”126 !
Furthermore, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) and Bank for International 
Settlement (“BIS”) have published several reports.127 Organisations such as the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) have been very active in 
responding to various regulatory proposals promoting international standards.128 On 
an overall note, regulators seem to be referring to IOSCO standards when proposing 
their respective regulations; this has to be considered a great success. 
 
From an international trade perspective it would be desirable to have completely 
harmonised regulations across the globe. However, due to differences in local markets 
and regulatory traditions it is probably highly unlikely that this will ever become 
reality. For a fact, jurisdictions will impose clearing mandates as regards different 
products, participants exempted will vary from country to country and participants 
will be subject to different and sometimes colliding requirements. Further, CCPs will 
face a whole range of different requirements depending on country of operation.  
 
Harmonisation is of paramount importance, but it is not easy to achieve overnight. 
Yet, hopes are that further harmonisation will be seen in the future, which would 
mitigate problems seen in today’s regulatory regimes. However, harmonisation would 
not resolve the problems identified if each framework does not provide for 
recognition regimes of overseas CCPs. Point is, if regulations across the globe were 
harmonised, such recognition would not be equally controversial. 
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126 IOSCO members are drawn from, and regulate, over 100 jurisdictions and its number of members 
continues to grow. Its primary members are the financial market regulators in each jurisdiction 
(http://www.iosco.org/about/ and https://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background). 
127 FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, were FSB made 21 recommendations on 
issues to be resolved by regulators. FSB has since followed the implementation progress compiling 
reports covering multiple jurisdictions. See FSB’s most recent report on implementation, FSB, OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms Third Progress Report on Implementation. See also BIS, The 
macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central counterparties in OTC 
derivatives markets. 
128 ISDA’s recommendations and comments available at: http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/public-
policy/. 
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5.2 Regimes for Recognition of Overseas CCPs 
As indicated above, the key to success is spelled efficient and well-balanced regimes 
for recognition of overseas CCPs. Recalling Scenario 2 above, the Singapore Bank 
would have to be a member of a US DCO if trading with a US person, and a member 
of a EU CCP if trading with a EU counterparty. However, if for example the EU CCP 
was recognised by both Singapore and the US, the participants could clear all their 
trades through the EU CCP. Also the problem set out in Scenario 1 above, re-
structuring of transactions, would be solved if the chosen CCP was recognised in all 
four jurisdictions. From a CCP perspective, recognition in foreign jurisdictions is 
crucial enabling them to keep their business, why well-balanced recognition regimes 
would solve their problems as well.129 If regulators do not manage to put these 
recognition regimes in place, in time, but still prompt the clearing obligation, this will 
be disastrous for participants seeking to trade with international counterparties.130  
 
The recognition models that have been put forward by regulators to date will be 
described and criticised below. Subsequently, analysis as to how regulators 
alternatively should design their recognition regimes to help mitigate the problems 
identified will be provided. 
5.2.1 Recognition Regimes Proposed to Date  
The recognition regimes put forward to date require a detailed level of equivalence in 
legally binding requirements. EMIR, Article 25, prescribes as a prerequisite for 
recognition that “… the CCP authorised in that third country complies with legally 
binding requirements which are equivalent to the requirements set out under 
EMIR”. 131  The upside of this model is that it ensures high standards across 
jurisdictions and enables thorough oversight. Nevertheless, requirement for exactly 
“equivalent” regulation or legislation, in relation to domestic laws, runs into several 
problems. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Please refer to Scenario 3, in para. 4.2 above.  
130 Note that if location requirements would be imposed, recognition regimes would not help the 
participants. However, such location requirement would hopefully have limited effects on international 
transactions, since it would only be applied to systemically important products, which are products that 
to a high extent are traded within that jurisdiction by local participants. Moreover, tendencies show that 
regulators seem to pull back from the location requirement (apart from in Japan, India, China and 
South Korea), why location requirements are left aside in the following. 
131 The US, very high-level, proposal of exempting DCOs also refers to domestic legislation. Bearing 
in mind the US approach so far, of being reluctant to put reliance on foreign regulators, US will 
probably put forward a regime similar to EMIR’s. !
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Pursuant to this model, a CCP would have to ensure compliance with both domestic 
and other jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks (i.e. in the jurisdiction(s) where it 
seeks recognition). Firstly, as pointed out above, to comply with several legal 
frameworks is troublesome for CCPs and incurs great costs. In turn, this may put the 
CCP required to comply with several regimes in a competitive disadvantage. 
Naturally, this is a business decision, whether it finds it worthwhile to apply for 
recognition under these regimes. But facts are, that it would not serve the market on 
the whole since the participants in such case would have to split their portfolios and 
clear through several CCPs. Moreover, if CCPs decide not to go for recognition due 
to the costly procedure, this could lead to a market with very few operating CCPs in 
the OTC space. It is difficult to assess how many CCPs on the whole that would be 
suitable, but having very few CCPs would possibly increase systemic risk since too 
much risk would be accumulated in these few CCPs. A default of such internationally 
systemically important CCP would not only affect the regional market, but could be 
detrimental to the whole international financial market endangering the stability of 
real economy.132  
 
Secondly and more importantly, it might be impossible for a CCP to comply with 
equivalent regulations for a number of reasons: requirements of local laws may make 
it impossible for identical regulations to be imposed, the local market may not yet be 
sufficiently developed for identical regulations to be imposed, or there might be 
differences in local assets, local business models or local financing structures.133 
 
CCPs domiciled in a market not designed around the size and product range as seen in 
the EU and US would have problems getting recognised. The major OTC derivatives 
markets are concentrated to the US and the EU, whilst the market in for example 
Australia is concentrated to a few products.134 Further, CCPs that are largely designed 
around the size and product range of the markets in the EU and US might have 
participants criteria that are not well calibrated with a local smaller market. Therefore, 
CCPs required to hold a lower level of admission requirements adjusted to the local !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 IMF (2010) p. 21 et seq. 
133 GFMA, FSR, IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, 
clients and regulators p. 10. 
134 Council of Financial Regulators, Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives in Australia p. 27 et seq. 
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market participants, would not be able to achieve equivalence with EU or US 
requirements. Furthermore, participants in these local markets may not be able to 
meet the clearing member requirements set forth by the CCPs in major OTC 
derivatives markets, thus forced to meet the clearing requirements through client 
clearing. Client clearing may not be as advantageous as direct clearing, since direct 
clearing might allow for greater netting opportunities and avoidance of an additional 
layer of fees etc.135 Being a direct member may also signal a dealer’s creditworthiness 
or market standing.136 CCP membership criteria that do not commensurate with the 
level of risk to be managed in the domestic market might unduly limit the diversity of 
local participants and overtime render in higher costs, lack of innovation and greater 
concentration of exposure to end-users in the local smaller market.137  
 
Conclusively, to require equivalence to local laws for recognition is a too high 
requirement that may be impossible for CCPs to meet for the reasons stated above, 
which would also affect participants customised to smaller markets.   
5.2.2 Alternative Recognition Regimes 
From both a participant and CCP perspective, it might be tempting to simply propose 
recognition of overseas CCPs without this troublesome evaluations of requirements 
imposed on the overseas CCPs. However, not to assess the standards of the CCP 
applying for recognition would undermine the vast efforts to sufficiently regulate 
CCPs, and such order would inevitably pose a risk for regulatory arbitrage. After all, 
central counterparty clearing is introduced for the purpose of creating stability in the 
OTC derivatives market, thus CCPs must be able to bear the responsibility of 
facilitating this. Moreover, if overseas CCPs not equally regulated would be let into 
the domestic market this would create an un-level playing field between CCPs. 
Participants would, perhaps, choose the cheapest alternative thus putting the CCPs 
highly regulated out of business. To uphold a sufficient standard of the regulatory 
platform, financial standing, risk management procedure etc. of CCPs, it is necessary 
to require some kind of assessment in relation to the requirements imposed on the 
CCP in question.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 Please refer to para. 4.1.2.1 above. 
136 Council of Financial Regulators, Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives in Australia p. 14. 
137 Council of Financial Regulators, Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives in Australia p. 32-33. 
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Instead of assessing equality of legal requirements on the detailed level that is put 
forward in current frameworks, it would be beneficial to assess the CCP in relation to 
international standards. Alternatively, a broader concept of equivalence could be 
adopted, referring to the effect of the legal requirements.138  
5.2.2.1 On Par with International Standards 
If assessing whether the CCP’s standard and the supervision of the same are on par 
with international recommendations and standards, this would mean that the CCP 
would not need to prove equivalence in relation to multiple legislations for 
recognition. Pursuant to this model, IOSCO would play an important role as holding 
the highest authority in the international regulatory space. Given that IOSCO has 
issued a number of recommendations on international standards in recent years, which 
regulators refer to when legislating this area, thus largely accepted, assessing 
compliance with IOSCO principles would not be foreign to national regulators. The 
most authoritative and recent IOSCO principles are found in Principles for financial 
market infrastructures, updated version issued in April 2012. 139  There are 24 
principles covering areas such a credit and liquidity risk management (including 
collateral management with corresponding segregation and portability issues), 
governance of the CCP, settlement procedures, default management procedures, 
admittance requirements of potential members and transparency etc.140  
By using this model, CCPs would, once deemed holding standards on par with 
IOSCO’s, be eligible for recognition in all relevant jurisdictions. Naturally, the CCP 
would still be subject to its own regulator’s supervision and possibly enhanced 
requirements correlating to the local market, but it would not need to go through the 
vast resource-consuming process of ensuring compliance with other regulatory 
regimes. Moreover, the possible need for legislators to change laws to enable a 
domestic CCP (that is seeking recognition in foreign jurisdictions) to be in 
compliance with foreign laws would not be necessary. 
The risk for un-level playing field between CCPs will to some extent remain using 
this model, since overseas CCPs may not be subject to equally burdensome !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 GFMA, FSR, IBFed and ISDA, Re: Extraterritorial legislation: the problems posed for markets, 
clients and regulators p. 10. 
139 IOSCO, Principles for financial market infrastructures  
140 In addition, IOSCO has issued 17 recommendations in relation to how the regulators should 
approach the clearing mandate, IOSCO, Requirements for Mandatory Clearing. 
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requirements compared to local CCPs. However, as long as the international standards 
are high enough, CCPs competing in the same clearing space would be on fairly equal 
footing.  Further, some CCPs and participants domiciled in smaller markets may still 
have problems complying with IOSCO standards, but these problems would not be as 
extensive compared to the proposed recognition regimes described above. High 
standards would still be upheld and further harmonisation in the regulatory space 
would be a probable outcome.  
 
An internationally accepted recognition regime that pushes for natural regulatory 
harmonisation would hopefully also help harmonising rules set out by the CCPs as 
self regulatory organisations. This would be beneficial from the participants’ 
perspective, insofar they would face similar admission criteria and ongoing 
requirements regardless of liaising with multiple CCPs.  
 
No regulator has proposed to refer to international standards in their recognition 
regimes. Notably however, the Hong Kong proposal refers to international standards 
when determining “acceptable” jurisdictions.141 This can be regarded as a support for 
international standards as being detailed and authoritative enough to be referred to in 
such legislation. 
5.2.2.2 Effect-Based Approach 
By face of evidence, regulators tend not to refer to international standards, but are 
eager to enforce their own legal and regulatory provisions on overseas participants 
and CCPs. If this continues to be the case, the prospect of a broader concept of 
equivalence, referring to the effect of the legal requirements might lend broader 
acceptance among regulators. A tendency in favour of this approach is seen in the 
Singapore proposal. To be eligible for recognition, the overseas CCP should be 
“…subject to requirements and supervision comparable, in the degree to which the 
objectives specified in section 47 are achieved, to the requirements and supervision to 
which approved clearing houses and recognised clearing houses are subject under 
this Act”.142 The objectives of section 47 are (a) to promote safe and efficient clearing 
facilities; and (b) to reduce systemic risk. At the time being, it remains unclear to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 For relevant description of Hong Kong proposal, please refer to paras. 3.3.3 and 3.4.3 above. 
142 MAS, New Part IIA of SFA Section 52(2)(b). 
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what extent the regulator intends to take on this “effect-based approach” by referring 
to achieving these objectives, but it at least shows a willingness towards adopting a 
more pragmatic approach.  
 
If this effect-based approach was to be acknowledged among regulators, CCPs and 
regulators would not have to stare themselves blind at legal details to be in 
compliance with in order to get recognition from a foreign authority. The risk of 
conflicting laws would be lower compared to the EMIR proposal. Under the effect-
based model, as the name suggests, the outcome of requirements/legislation would be 
assessed instead of the requirements/legislation itself. There would still be a slight 
risk for un-level playing field between local and overseas CCPs, but at least the 
recognising authority would assess the CCP in relation to domestic legislation, albeit 
not in detail, to safeguard the objectives of the same.  
5.2.3 Key Takeaways 
The currently proposed regimes for recognition of overseas CCPs are imposing too 
high standards of equivalence required in relation to domestic laws. Troublesome 
obstacles to overcome are created, which would reduce the possibilities of efficient 
recognition regimes working in practice. If regulators were to refer to international 
standards instead, this would help mitigating the problems identified. CCPs would be 
able to get recognised without the need of being in compliance with several 
jurisdictions’ laws, which also would reduce the home legislator’s possible need to 
constantly amend domestic laws. Realising regulators’ reluctance to step away from 
their own regulatory frameworks, another workable approach would be the effect-
based one. CCPs would still need to be in compliance with several regulatory 
frameworks, but rather on a high-level effect-basis. If either of these two proposed 
changes to the frameworks were adopted, it would mean a great step forward towards 
well-balanced and efficient recognition regimes. As mentioned before, this would 
benefit both the participant and CCP perspectives, which in turn would promote a 
sound financial market.  !  
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5.3 Interoperability 
Realising the possibly limited willingness of regulators to change their regulatory 
frameworks as regards recognition regimes as proposed above, it may be beneficial to 
step outside the legislative world and see whether there are any other legal 
constructions seen in associated markets that may help mitigate the problems 
identified. Interoperability between CCPs could be an innovative solution and has 
recently been introduced in the European equities market.143 Simply put, allowing 
interoperability would enable participants to meet the clearing obligation despite the 
original counterparties being members to different CCPs. 
The fact of clearing requiring the counterparties to clear through the same clearing 
house is not a new phenomena, but has always been the case. Why this is of increased 
importance after the OTC reform, is because an enhanced number of participants will 
have to clear their trades to a greater extent. More importantly as described above, the 
extraterritorial and protectionist approaches further create difficulties for participants 
wanting to clear at their CCP of choice. Market participants are faced with the 
unsavory prospect of having to break up its netting sets and increase the amount of 
capital needed because of their need to hold multiple clearing memberships. If 
interoperability was introduced in the OTC clearing space, participants would not 
need to clear different parts of their portfolios through different clearing houses. It is 
now relevant to first describe what interoperability is. Subsequently, an account of 
interoperability developments to date, its benefits and risks and an assessment of 
whether it is feasible to introduce interoperability in the OTC space is provided.  
5.3.1 What is interoperability? 
Interoperability refers to arrangements between two or more CCPs, allowing them to 
clear transactions executed by participants that are members to different interoperable 
CCPs. To illustrate; interoperability between CCPA and CCPB would allow for 
clearing of a transaction between a clearing member to CCPA and a clearing member 
to CCPB. There are different ways of arranging these links. One being that CCPA 
becomes a member to CCPB (“participant” links), another that CCPA and CCPB 
interoperate on an equal basis (“peer-to-peer” links). To simplify, this means that 
CCPA will become some sort of “intermediary” between its own member and CCPB, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 8.  
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who clears the trade, or vice versa. These two different models can be described as 
follows:!
 
• Participant links allow a CCP to maintain a link with another CCP in a manner 
similar to that of a direct participant that acts as a general clearing member. In 
other words, one CCP (the participant CCP) becomes a member to the other 
CCP (the host CCP). The participant CCP is then subject to the host CCP’s 
normal participants rules. The host CCP maintains an account for the 
participant CCP, and would typically require the participant CCP to provide 
margin, as would be the case for a participant that is not a CCP. Some 
harmonisation of risk management and operational requirements will be 
necessary to effectively manage the risks of trades cleared across the link. In 
contrast to a peer-to-peer link, cross-CCP risk management is not equal among 
CCPs since the participant CCP does not receive any financial resources to 
cover cross-CCP exposures.144 
• Peer-to-peer links allow CCPs to interoperate on an equal footing. Risk 
management between the CCPs is based on a bilaterally approved framework 
that ensures adequate coverage of cross-CCP exposures of all interoperating 
CCPs. In existing interoperability frameworks, CCPs exchange margin on a 
reciprocal basis, based on their individual margin models.145 
 
Both participant and peer-to-peer links enable clearing members to join only one CCP 
rather than having to join multiple CCPs. Further, these links can allow multilateral 
netting across commonly cleared products and participants of both CCPs.  
5.3.2 Interoperability Development to Date 
In 2006 an initiative was taken by participants active in the clearing space who wrote 
a voluntary code, “The European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement”, 
where signatories pledged to open up to competition through price transparency, 
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144BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 17, and IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures p. 112-113. 
145 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 17. 
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access and interoperability.146 Since then, EuroCCP and LCH.Clearnet have been the 
most driving parties among the CCPs to introduce interoperability.147 Over the last six 
months Chi-X Europe, BATS Europe, Burgundy and Turquoise have launched full 
four-way interoperability, allowing for all trades executed on these platforms to be 
cleared on an interoperable basis through any of the four interoperating CCPs (EMCF, 
EuroCCP, LCH.Clearnet and SIX x-clear).148  
 
The interoperability agreements between the four CCPs are confidential commercial 
agreements, thus impossible to know for sure how these links are set up.149 Available 
information show that each CCP respectively will calculate the additional risk 
imposed due to interoperability, and require each of its members to provide additional 
margin to cover open liabilities between interoperating CCPs. Operationally, where 
the seller of a security is using CCPA, and the buyer is using CCPB, it is the 
responsibility of CCPA to take delivery from its selling clearing member and deliver 
the security to CCPB for onward delivery to its buying clearing member. In event of a 
CCP’s default, it will be subject to default management procedures from the surviving 
CCPs.150 
 
The newly introduced interoperability seen today is a great step forward, but 
nevertheless little helpful to participants required to clear OTC derivatives. Current 
interoperable links only allow for clearing of on-exchange traded products.151 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 The European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement, a voluntary Code, was written by 
FESE, EACH, ECSDA and the industry associations for European securities exchanges, central 
counterparties and central securities depositories, in November 2006. 
147 For an overview of the progress of establishing interoprability between these CCPs, please refer to 
http://www.euroccp.co.uk/interoperability/milestones.php. 
148 Also Nasdaq OMX was to offer interoperable clearing, but recently postponed its planned April 
launch ”due to uncertainty surrounding interoperability requirements from regulators and industry 
groups”, refer to http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=8471. 
149 Refer to: http://www.euroccp.co.uk/interoperability/milestones.php and 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/cash_equities/equityclear.asp. 
150 LCH.Clearnet, Frequently Asked Questions regarding Interoperability for Equities p.4. 
151 Interoperable links between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives are somewhat held back by regulators. 
In the OTC reform, EMIR only enshrines a right for CCPs to enter into interoperability arrangements 
as regards cash securities. ESMA will review the scope of interoperability arrangements first in 2014, 
please refer to Recital 73, EMIR. Both the Australian and Japanese regulators are positive to 
interoperable link arrangements, while other jurisdictions’ regulators seem a bit more cautious staying 
quiet in their regulatory proposals.  
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5.3.3 Benefits from Interoperability 
5.3.3.1 No Need for Multiple Clearing Memberships 
Interoperability enables participants to meet the clearing obligation despite the 
counterparties being members to different CCPs.152 Recalling the Scenario 2 set out 
above, interoperability between the Singapore CCP and the US CCP would allow the 
counterparties to clear the transaction, using both CCPs, instead of requiring the 
participant to become a member or client to the other CCP as well. Furthermore, in 
event of a jurisdiction requiring local clearing, this would mean a deadlock in terms of 
recognition regimes. Interoperability however, would enable a local participant 
subject to the clearing location requirement to continuously use the local CCP, while 
the other party to the transaction may use an overseas CCP.153 Conclusively, both 
major problems identified for participants above, i.e. the need for re-structuring trades 
and to hold multiple clearing memberships, would be mitigated if interoperability was 
introduced.  
5.3.3.2 Multilateral Netting and Increased Liquidity 
Through interoperability, participants would be allowed to use whichever CCP gives 
them greatest margin efficiency and lowest clearing fees, and have the two CCPs face 
each other. By using only one CCP, the participant would only need to put margin 
paid on net obligations to one CCP, instead of multiple pots of margin with several 
CCPs.  
Links between CCPs give greater scope for multilateral netting compared to non-
linked CCPs. By linking CCPs together, participants would have access to a larger 
pool of counterparties. The CCP could then facilitate netting to a greater extent, thus 
subject their participants to lower margin requirements.154 This can be done either by 
allowing a participant to focus all of its clearing activity within one CCP, or by 
allowing CCPs to share collateral through cross-margining.155 By way of illustration; 
Participant X is a clearing member to both CCPA and CCPB, and suffers losses on its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 17.!
153 Harrison, Clearing at the Crossroads p. 3. 
154 An interoperable CCP would probably require additional margin due to the interoperable link. 
However, according to calculations, the additional margin required for interoperability would still 
account for less than if required to post margin with several CCPs, EuroCCP, Is Interoperability the 
model for the CCPs? p.6. 
155 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 17. 
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exposures in CCPA, but gains in CCPB. Interoperability between CCPA and CCPB 
would allow the participant to either (i) being a member to only CCPA and still clear 
with participants to CCPB, in such case Participant X would have all its exposure in 
CCPA, thus being able to net its losses against its gains; or (ii) if Participant X 
chooses to be a member to both CCPA and CCPB, its gains and losses in the two 
CCPs could still be netted through cross-margining between the interoperating CCPs. 
Furthermore, since netting could be facilitated to a greater extent, the CCP’s total 
exposure towards its members would be reduced. The availability of a larger pool of 
counterparties may increase number of transactions. Together with multilateral netting 
and thereby a reduced demand for collateral, this may create higher liquidity in these 
markets.156 
5.3.3.3 Increased Competition 
Interoperability as a concept means that competitors are forced to cooperate in order 
to provide choice and more efficient services to consumers, while still competing on 
price and quality. In the on-exchange traded market, participants are usually forced to 
clear its trades through the CCP appointed by the trading venue. When the clearing 
mandate for OTC derivatives enters into force, participants will be forced to clear 
through a CCP appointed by the regulator. Worth noting in this context is the on-
exchange trading mandate for some OTC derivatives that is up and coming in line 
with the G20 objectives.157 Participants are free to choose their trading venue (or 
over-the-counter), but must clear at a specific CCP. This arrangement means limited 
competition among CCPs. If interoperability was developed, participants would be 
able to choose their clearing facility, which would foster greater competition thus 
have a positive impact in the capital market.158  
5.3.3.4 Interoperability from the CCP Perspective 
As been pointed out above, there are several benefits from interoperability both from 
the participant perspective and the market perspective. As to the CCP perspective, the 
benefits may not be as obvious. Due to the risks of interoperability, set out below, 
such links will probably be strictly regulated thus subject CCPs to meet requirements !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 17-18. 
157 Looking forward, trading venues will have an increasingly influential role in the participants’ choice 
of clearing venue, why interoperability in the future is of even higher importance from a market 
perspective. Please refer to para. 2.1 above for a reminder of the G20 objectives.  
158 Chan, Interoperability: Is it worth the effort? 
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comparable to the recognition regimes described above. It may actually be rather 
likely that cross-border interoperability will require recognition of the CCPs in 
relevant jurisdictions. In such case, the problems identified for CCPs would not be 
solved by interoperability at the outset. Once in place however, interoperability has 
great advantages for CCPs. By interoperating with other CCPs, the CCP can (i) get 
access to new markets and clear for international participants; (ii) facilitate position 
netting to a greater extent thus limit its exposure towards its participants; and (iii) 
together with the interoperating CCP reduce costs of systems development and 
operational costs since they can share some of the expenses.159  
5.3.4 Interoperability – a Risky Business? 
There is a fright that the regulatory reform would not remove the systemic risk from 
the trading of OTC derivatives, but rather shift the risks from banks to CCPs.160 As 
noted above, CCPs will be of greater systemic importance to the financial market 
after the G20 objectives are met and will be regarded as systemically important 
financial institutions (“SIFIs”). Pundits’ views are that CCPs should not take on credit 
risk themselves or pledge their capital as collateral to another CCP since CCPs are 
meant to offer protection to its members, not to be risk-taking intermediaries.161 To 
link these CCPs up to each other would introduce a new form of interconnectivity into 
the financial system. It might seem contradictory to propose interoperability as a 
solution to the issues set out above, since regulators and stakeholders have spent the 
last three years trying to remove interconnectedness in the financial system. The main 
reasons for the, at the time being, not so very optimistic future of interoperability 
between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives can be divided in three risk categories: (a) 
contagion risks; (b) legal risks; and (c) operational risks. 
5.3.4.1 Contagion Risks 
As describes above, an interoperating CCP has to cover its exposure towards the other 
CCP by posting collateral to the other CCP. In line with IOSCO’s recommendations, 
each CCP in a link arrangement should be able to cover, at least on a daily basis, its 
current exposure to the linked CCP and its participants. At the same time, the link 
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159 IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 110. 
160 IMF, Making OTC Derivatives Safe – A Fresh Look p. 1. 
161 EuroCCP, Recommendations for Reducing Risks Among Interoperating CCPs p.7. 
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arrangement should not affect the CCP’s ability to address other risks.162 Today the 
CCP’s only resources are the collateral from its participants and the default fund. The 
CCP could collect additional collateral from its participant and use that to post at the 
other CCP for its own exposure. However, tendencies show that re-use of 
participants’ margin may not be allowed in some jurisdictions.163 In such case, 
alternative financial resources must be used.164 In addition, or instead of posting 
collateral, the CCP can contribute to the other CCP’s default fund.  
If a CCP posts margins in the other CCP, it is of foremost importance that the margin 
posted in the other CCP is sufficiently segregated and unencumbered to secure the 
CCP’s standing in event of the other CCP’s default.  
If the CCP contributes to the other CCP’s default fund, the CCP becomes exposed to 
the other CCP’s participants’ default. If the other CCP exhausts its default waterfall, it 
will use the linked CCP’s default fund contribution. The CCP always face the risk of 
having to exhaust its default waterfall, but a linked CCP faces a greater risk to the 
extent that the CCP is unable to directly monitor or control the other CCP’s 
participants. 165  To be clear, interoperable links create new channels for risk 
propagation. By CCPs contributing to each other’s default funds, the CCPs may 
transmit the effect of a participant’s default between each other.166 Therefore, IOSCO 
recommends interoperating CCPs to hold a separate default fund. Furthermore, it is 
recommended that any default fund contributions or allocation of uncovered losses 
should be structured to ensure that (a) no linked CCP is treated less favourably than 
the participants of the other CCP and (b) each CCP’s contribution to the loss sharing 
arrangements of the other is no more than proportionate to the risk the first CCP poses 
to the linked CCP.167 
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162 IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 113. 
163 Please refer to para. 2.2.4 above and IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 
113-114. 
164 EuroCCP, Recommendations for Reducing Risks Among Interoperating CCPs p. 10 et seq. The use 
of bank guarantees to secure inter-CCP obligations would be a possible solution for CCPs not able to 
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165 IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 114. 
166 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 19. 
167 IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 115. 
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In a non-linked CCP, the CCP only has to assess risks incurred by its members and its 
customers. If it is linked towards another CCP, it also has to consider risks posed by 
that CCP’s members and customer. Links between three or more CCPs increasingly 
complicates the contagion risk assessment procedure. The nature of the current 
interoperability agreements as being confidential, adds on to the difficulties of 
assessing risks.168 
5.3.4.2 Legal Risks 
Especially in a cross-border trading environment, which is of highest relevance in this 
paper, there are several legal issues that have to be dealt with in order to enable 
interoperability between CCPs operating in different jurisdictions.  
 
Firstly, laws and rules governing settlement finality may differ between jurisdictions. 
Likewise, enforceability of the CCPs’ obligation assumed by novation, or a similar 
legal device, may also differ. This could lead to a situation where a transaction is 
regarded as properly “transferred” to the CCP, or finally settled, in one jurisdiction 
and not in the other.169 The problem of being subject to conflicting laws in this regard 
if a participant is defaulting at this critical point of time is evident. One CCP may 
have assumed obligations and rights, while the other has not, which can lead to 
difficulties in accessing collateral and being protected from possible bankruptcy 
proceedings.170 The possibility of a bankruptcy proceeding brings us to the next 
crucial legal issue: harmonisation of insolvency laws. 
 
The posted collateral is at risk of being subject to a trustee in bankruptcy’s claw-back, 
i.e. that the trustee may ringfence the collateral as being part of the defaulter’s estate. 
The mere idea and benefit of CCP clearing could be endangered if it was not able to 
carry out its default management procedure, including porting of customers’ position 
and collateral.171 To protect the collateral posted, the CCPs should not be subject to 
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168 EuroCCP, Recommendations for Reducing Risks Among Interoperating CCPs p. 5. 
169 IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 110-111.!
170 For example, some countries have ”zero hour rules”, that make every transaction by a bankrupt 
participant void from the start of the day of the bankruptcy. This could be increasingly troublesome 
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171 Please refer to para. 2.2.6 above for a description of porting of customers’ position. 
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“normal” insolvency laws.172 For example, the Singapore laws afford insolvency 
override protection to CCPs, providing a prohibition for trustees to claw-back 
collateral posted in accordance with clearing agreements.173 From an international 
trade perspective, and especially when it comes to cross-border interoperability, the 
statutory insolvency protection must be effective in relation to foreign bankruptcy 
proceedings as well.174 The rules, procedures and contracts related to a CCP’s 
operation should be enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions.175  
 
Furthermore, differences in insolvency laws may give participants to CCPA 
unintended rights to claim assets from CCPB in event of CCPA’s default. This if 
CCPA has posted assets (collateral to cover its exposure to CCPB) in CCPB, out of 
which participants to CCPA may claim their right to. Likewise, collateral from CCPB, 
held in CCPA may be endangered if not segregated properly. Therefore, rights and 
obligations of the CCPs and their participants must be clearly stated in the 
interoperability agreement.176 In addition, the terms of the link agreement should also 
set out, in cross-jurisdictional contexts, an unambiguous choice of law that will 
govern each aspect of the link.  
 
These possible legal risks demand further investigation and laws possibly need to be 
harmonised to enable cross-border interoperability.  
5.3.4.3 Operational Risks 
CCPs are to a great extent self regulatory organisations, meaning that they set up rules 
for themselves and their participants to follow, albeit approved by their regulator. As 
underlined above, CCPs’ default management procedures are of foremost importance 
to ensure the intended benefits from central clearing. CCPs may use different risk 
management tools. In order to assure effectiveness of risk management and default 
procedures, harmonisation between interoperating CCPs might be necessary. By way 
of example, the interoperating CCPs may have different rules for declaring a member 
in default. The result of this could be that a CCP must replace a contract without 
having access to the collateral held in another CCP (similar to the legal risk of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 24.!
173 Section 81F of the Securities and Futures Act. 
174 IMF, Making OTC Derivatives Safe – A Fresh Look p. 7. 
175 IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 24. 
176 IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures p. 111.!
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differences in laws governing settlement finality etc. above).177 Furthermore, the 
CCPs would have to establish cooperative arrangement for oversight and exchange of 
information, since insufficient information would endanger the CCP’s ability to assess 
risks and calculate exposures.178 
 
As regards interoperability between CCPs clearing on-exchange traded products, the 
risks presented above are obviously already mitigated to a level accepted by 
supervising authorities. Nevertheless, pundits are not very positive to interoperability 
between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives, which will be analysed in the following. 
5.3.5 Interoperability in the OTC Derivatives Space 
“Just the posting of additional collateral would be a nightmare (…) and I’m not even 
going to talk about default management and all the complications you would have to 
consider to get rid of positions in a world where you are connected to other CCPs. I 
think it is very challenging.”179 !!
By face of evidence, the true problem lies within the nature of the OTC products. In 
order for an OTC derivatives contract to be eligible for clearing it has to be 
sufficiently standardised and liquid. Why the standardisation and liquidity of such 
products are essential is because of the need to calculate the risk such transactions 
imposes on the CCPs, which in turn determines the margin required.180 Depending on 
how easy orphaned contracts can be replaced and how long the settlement period is 
etc., the CCP will require correlating security in terms of margin from the 
participant.181 !!
Different margin standards and default fund requirements among various CCPs means 
difficulties in calculating the exposure between CCPs. When clearing OTC 
derivatives, the sometimes complex and bespoke nature and the long maturity of these 
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177 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 18. 
178 BIS, The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets p. 19. 
179 This put forward by Alberto Pravettoni, managing director at LCH.Clearnet, as a comment to the 
possibilities of interoperability between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives. See Whittall, No CCP 
interoperability in our lifetime. 
180 Please refer to paras. 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 above for an account of calculation of margins and the nature 
of the OTC derivatives contract. 
181 Please refer to para. 2.2.4 above for a description of the margin calculation. 
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products increase the difficulty in calculating margins required. On-exchange traded 
cash securities on the other hand are typically standardised and have a relatively short 
settlement period, normally two to three days, which makes it easier to predict the 
risks incurred by interoperability.182 Furthermore, the legal risks, in particular the 
ones relating to insolvency laws, may be greater as regards OTC derivatives. This due 
to the longevity of these contracts, which tend to live for years in contrast to on-
exchange traded products.  
 
The OTC reform is still in a very immature state, and to date it is not even determined 
which products that will be subject to the clearing mandate.183 Thus a thorough 
assessment of whether interoperability would be feasible is difficult to carry out. In 
due course however, interoperable links between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives may 
not be as risky as seems to be the case today. The most heavily traded products will 
become more standardised over time, and the use of central clearing would further 
increase liquidity in these markets and provide for well-established price discovery 
mechanisms. Looking forward, the realisation of the other G20 objectives as well, in 
particular the on-exchange trading mandate, will doubtlessly accelerate the crucial 
standardisation and liquidity enhancement. Once reaching this stage, interoperability 
should be possible and serve the market well.184!
5.3.6 Key Takeaways 
The benefits from interoperability are unquestionable, both from a market perspective 
and from a participant perspective. The participants would not need to hold multiple 
clearing memberships and would enjoy the full benefits from netting and clearing 
with larger pools of counterparties. They would neither have to re-structure their 
trades in order to avoid compliance with the different regimes. The market would be 
served by increased liquidity and greater efficiency due to higher competition 
between CCPs. CCPs would still probably be subject to vast regulatory requirements, 
but benefit from new market opportunities and possibly lower costs in the long run.  
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182 Whittall, No CCP interoperability in our lifetime.  
183 Please refer to para. 3.2 above for regulatory development as regards products to be subject to the 
clearing mandate. 
184 It should hereby be noted that the increased standardisation of derivatives is not uncontroversial. 
Standardisation naturally limits the parties’ ability to contract at their discretion, which may affect the 
possibility of achieving the purpose of the derivatives contract. However, the end-user exemptions 
provided for in the frameworks are meant to mitigate the drawback of increased standardisation. 
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Although, facts remain – interoperability in the OTC derivatives space is associated 
with risks that, at the moment, are not fully foreseeable. Most of the risks identified 
with interoperability in the OTC market are relevant in relation to interoperability in 
the securities market as well. However, the immaturity of the OTC reform and the 
nature of the products to be cleared incur too much insecurity at the time being. 
Simply, to introduce interoperability between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives at this 
stage would not only be operationally challenging, but also irresponsible. If risks 
cannot be managed correctly, which is impossible without thorough and reliable 
assessment of the same, interconnectivity between CCPs could endanger the stability 
in the financial system. The major obstacle to overcome is to sufficiently standardise 
OTC products, so that CCPs can evaluate risks imposed by clearing through an 
interoperable CCP. To sum up, interoperability is unlikely to be the saving hand in the 
year of 2012.185!
6 Final Remarks  
6.1 Introduction 
Simply put, the extraterritorial and protectionist provisions and the problems they 
cause for participants and CCPs, create a risk for decreased trading activity and 
segregation of the OTC derivatives market. Doubtlessly regulators have tried to come 
up with regulations fit for the industry, and vast resources have been put into public 
consultations as well as discussions with stakeholders throughout the legislative 
process. It is easy to be blinded by the problems caused by these new regulations, but 
let us not forget the benefits that derive from the same. Once in place, and if the big 
remaining issues are dealt with properly, the OTC derivatives market and its 
surrounding infrastructure will be sufficiently regulated thus contribute to a stable and 
sound financial market on the whole. One part of the big remaining issues to resolve 
has been the focus in this thesis, namely; the problems caused by extraterritorial and 
protectionist provisions imposed by various regulators.  
 
The extraterritorial reach of EMIR is still unclear, while the scope of the Dodd-Frank 
Act recently was “clarified” by CFTC. Even though the extraterritorial reach of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is quite complex and has not been examined in depth in this paper, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 IOSCO, Requirements for Mandatory Clearing p. 39. 
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is clear that it reaches far outside the US boundaries. Naturally, this has been subject 
to backlash from foreign regulators and international bodies, concerns have also been 
raised from CFTC commissioners opposing to the extraterritorial reach of the Dodd-
Frank Act. 
 
The CEO of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”), Patrick 
Raaflaub, recently said that due to concerns of duplicate requirements “…we cannot 
exclude that FINMA may have to deny financial institutions permission to supply 
certain information or grant direct access to U.S. supervisors”.186 This statement 
could further imply the beginning of a power struggle between the US regulator and 
other regulators. Facts are, even if CFTC mandates foreign entities to comply with 
Dodd-Frank requirements, foreign entities’ home regulators can deny them ability to 
do so.  
Furthermore, the European Commissioner Michael Barnier of the Internal Market and 
Services division has called on CFTC to rethink the extraterritorial reach: “The US 
has shown initiative in developing rules for the derivatives market. I now call on US 
authorities to show leadership in applying them fairly. They must be prepared to rely 
on equivalent rules in host countries”.187  
It does not require a vastly perspicacious person to realise that the US and, probably, 
the EU proposals, “step on the toes of other sovereign nations”, as stated by the 
opposing CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia.188 It remains to be seen whether 
ESMA will prescribe an equally extraterritorial reach of EMIR, or if it will take a step 
back affording greater reliance on foreign regulators. The US and the EU, currently 
holding the largest OTC derivatives markets, naturally have great responsibilities in 
adopting well-balanced and efficient frameworks. Not only because EMIR and Dodd-
Frank affect the highest number of participants and CCPs, but also since other 
regulators around the globe tend to copy these frameworks when regulating their own 
markets.  
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Recalling that this thesis is neither about political issues nor about upset regulators 
and stakeholders around the globe, the last section consists of concluding discussions 
on problems identified with the extraterritorial and protectionist approaches, and ways 
to mitigate those.  
6.2 Concluding Discussions 
Analysing these new frameworks from the three perspectives in an international 
context, it is clear that the proposed extraterritorial and protectionist approaches 
create problems to both participants and CCPs, that in turn have negative 
consequences for the market on the whole. At the end of the day, the mere idea of the 
OTC reform is to create transparency, reduce interconnectedness between participants 
and to enhance liquidity and standardisation for the purpose of building a sound and 
resilient financial market. When regulators build in structures that endanger the 
achievement of the purposes, it ought to be addressed properly. 
 
Of course, this thesis could propose that regulators should remove the extraterritorial 
provisions and solely regulate strictly domestic participants and by way of evasion 
provisions try to catch those evading the clearing mandate. This approach is more or 
less taken in Singapore, and if all jurisdictions did the same the process of 
implementing the clearing mandate across the globe would probably not run into all 
the problems of today. However, to simply propose such solution could not be 
justified for the following reasons: 
(i) To regulate extraterritorially could be regarded as legitimate taking into 
account foreign participants and CCPs’ impact on the local market. If the US 
and the EU only were concerned with strictly domestic institutions, they 
would perhaps be criticised as irresponsible. However, what is problematic 
and lack justification is the protectionist approach, where no reliance is put in 
foreign regulators. That said, it would of course be meritorious if the US and 
possibly the EU could narrow down the extraterritorial reach of their 
provisions, to reduce the problems caused, i.e. so that fewer participants and 
CCPs would be affected. 
(ii) The problems identified would possibly not be completely eliminated even if 
extraterritorial provisions were abolished. Participants trading with 
counterparties from different jurisdictions would still be subject to the 
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clearing mandate in these jurisdiction, due to its counterparties’ obligation 
stipulated in their domestic laws, i.e. analysis of the recognition regimes 
would be inevitable anyway. 
(iii)  It is highly unlikely that the US and the EU (if they proceed on the 
extraterritorial path) will step back to the great extent needed, why such 
proposal would be rather uninteresting from a practical perspective.  
 
For the time being, the frameworks force participants to re-structure their trades and 
hold multiple clearing memberships or client clearing arrangements in order to ensure 
compliance. CCPs would have vast problems in trying to get recognised in foreign 
jurisdictions in their struggle to keep clearing for their international participants. In 
trying to resolve these problems, the research has been focused to three different 
levels: (i) the overall level; (ii) the legislative level; and (iii) the constructive level.  
6.2.1 The Overall Level 
Recognising differences in local markets and to some extent unwillingness to fully 
harmonise, it would not be adequate to post international harmonisation alone as the 
solution to the problems caused. Moreover, efficient and sufficient harmonisation 
would rather come as a side effect of introducing new legal devices or solutions (such 
as recognition regimes or interoperability). Recognising this, proposing to enforce 
harmonisation the other way around would come across as a pretty blunt tool for the 
purpose of mitigating the problems identified. Nevertheless, international 
harmonisation is continuously of paramount importance.  
6.2.2 The Legislative Level 
Identifying well-balanced recognition regimes as the best way of mitigating the 
problems faced by participants and CCPs, it was worthwhile investigating in more 
detail how these proposed frameworks could be altered in order to create the desired 
effects. From both a participant and CCP perspective, it would be beneficial if the 
recognitions regimes allowed for recognition of overseas CCPs if the requirements 
imposed on them were on par with international standards. Even though the IOSCO 
principles are not binding, they have a high authoritative standing. CCPs as self-
regulatory organisations and regulators around the globe do refer to the need for 
meeting IOSCO principles when amending members’ admission criteria, clearing 
rules or when legislating this area of law. To facilitate this model of referring to 
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international standards for recognition, IOSCO as a supranational organisation would 
need to step in and assess whether CCPs fulfil the set standards. This may not be 
feasible, but would nevertheless benefit the international OTC derivatives market and 
further speed up the harmonisation process.  
 
The effect-based approach, where the overseas CCP would be eligible for recognition 
if the requirements imposed on them would give the same effect as the domestic laws, 
might gain greater recognition among regulators. This assumption is based upon the 
following facts: (i) the Singapore proposal is leaning towards such solution, which in 
turn may have a spin off effect; and (ii) the domestic authorities would still be 
allowed to somewhat assess the overseas CCPs in relation to domestic laws, which 
they seem very keen on doing.  
 
The case may be that a combination of the two recognition models presented above 
would be the best solution. Starting off with an assessment in relation to international 
standards, and in order to ensure that the CCP is fit for the particular market in which 
it is applying for recognition, the domestic recognising authority may impose some 
additional effect-based requirements for the CCP to meet.  
 
To regulate a global market on a national basis and thereby prescribing a broad 
extraterritorial scope in combination with protectionist provisions that show no 
reliance on foreign regulators, is not a good solution. It is not claimed that the 
proposals on how to alter these recognition frameworks are perfect solutions taking 
into account every aspect that national regulators must when regulating this area of 
law. However, from the participant, CCP and market perspectives, which have been 
the focus of this thesis, regulators should be recommended to reconsider and adopt 
either, or both, of the proposed approaches for recognition of overseas CCPs.  
6.2.3 The Constructive Level 
When examining this brand new area of law, which still is in the developing phase, it 
may be beneficial to search for solutions outside the legislative frameworks. 
Interoperability in the securities market was primarily established to increase 
competition and customer choice. When examining this legal construction however, it 
was evident that interoperability between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives could, apart 
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from enhancing competition and customer choice, mitigate the problems identified in 
this thesis in particular from the participant perspective.  
 
Today, interoperability between CCPs clearing OTC derivative would be a risky 
business, but nevertheless a great way of mitigating the problems caused. Striving to 
find solutions, it might be tempting to ignore the fright and negativity surrounding 
interoperability, and simply present interoperability as the way to go. Unfortunately, 
that would be irresponsible. To introduce a new sort of interconnectedness between 
systemically important institutions deserves some thought and thorough assessments 
of risks imposed. To date, neither CCPs nor regulators are fit for that task.  
 
Nevertheless, the future is likely to hold great opportunities for interoperability 
between CCPs clearing OTC derivatives. Given that interoperability is newly 
introduced for on-exchange traded products, some experience from this exercise 
would be necessary in order to assess possibilities for interoperability in the OTC 
derivatives space. In due course, once some OTC products reach a sufficient level of 
standardisation and liquidity, provided that the CCPs at this stage are familiar with 
calculating the risk imposed by clearing these products, it is likely that the industry 
will push for interoperability given its clear advantages. Reaching this point of time 
the, hopefully well-balanced, recognition regimes ought to have pushed for enhanced 
harmonisation, which would further mitigate the risks of interoperability. 
 
At this immature stage however, it is wise not to encourage interoperability between 
CCPs clearing OTC derivatives by regulatory means. Conclusively, it is neither likely 
nor desirable to introduce interoperability as a solution to the problems seen in the 
year of 2012, but rather as a complement to increase the freedom of trade and clearing 
further down the line.  
6.3 So, What Happens Now? 
Finally, the reader’s attention should be drawn to the greatest mystery of all. The 
problems set forward in this paper are real, laws and regulations in its current form 
will doubtlessly hit hard on participants trading OTC derivatives and on CCPs 
clearing these products. This is crystal clear. What is not clear but rather a great 
mystery, is how authorities around the globe intend to solve these delicate problems. 
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The clock is ticking and the deadline for implementation, which some regulators still 
claim will be met, is rapidly approaching. My guess, which do not require deep level 
of understanding nor intelligence whatsoever, is that regulators either; (a) will 
postpone implementation; (b) grant wide interim exemptions; or (c) provide an 
interim allowance to clear at the CCP of choice. Looking forward however, once the 
regulators have wrapped their heads around how to escape the deadline for 
implementation, I strongly believe international harmonisation, well-balanced 
recognition regimes and, in the future, interoperability would resolve or at a minimum 
mitigate the problems caused by the regulations of today.  ! !
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